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INTRODUCTION

Punishment has been the sticking point in the "peace talks"
between the Government of Colombia (GOC) and the paramilitaries since negotiations started in 2003. Soon after the GOC
announced plans for the demobilization of this group of some
15,000 to 20,000 right-wing fighters, Colombian civil society and
media, the international community, and a significant number of
national legislators joined in a demand that the paramilitaries,
whose human rights record is the worst of all parties to Colombia's four-decade armed conflict,' be punished for their crimes.
1. It is estimated that the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) is
responsible for 75% of the civilian deaths connected to the conflict, which have
averaged 3500 per year. See Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorism: Questions and
Answers, FARC, ELN, AUC: Colombia, Rebels, http://cfrterrorism.org/groups/
farc2.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Council on Foreign Relations].
Between January 1994 and December 2003, 1959 massacres (10,174 deaths) were
reported in Colombia, the large majority of which are attributed to the paramilitaries.
Starting in 2002, the share of serious violations attributed to the Revolutiorary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) increased dramatically, while the paramilitaries'
share began to fall. THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA WITH THE AUTODEFENSAS
UNIDAS DE COLOMBIA - AUC 2 (Cynthia J. Arnson ed., 2005) [hereinafter PEACE
PROCESS IN COLOMBIA]. See also ANGEL RABASA & PETER CHALK, COLOMBIAN
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When the paramilitaries responded with a non-negotiable refusal
to spend a single day in jail,2 a top paramilitary commander's
assessment that the talks were "hanging by an unraveling
thread"3 seemed sadly accurate.
The debate on punishment was taken to the Colombian Congress in August 2003 when President Alvaro Uribe proposed the
"Penal Alternatives Bill," providing for non-prison sanctions for
demobilizing paramilitaries.4 Surprisingly, while the GOC deliberated over the punishment question and in the face of uncertainty as to the legal implications of demobilization, more than
5000 paramilitaries proceeded to hand over their weapons and
vow to live peaceably,' presumably optimistic that the product of
congressional debate would be favorable to them. Their gamble
paid off in June 2005 when the Congress passed the Peace and
Justice Law, which grants most of them an outright pardon and
subjects those responsible for the worst crimes to a maximum sentence of eight years' confinement, most likely served in low-security facilities in the countryside.'
Passage of the new law has done little to quiet the debate on
the desirability of affording paramilitaries lenient treatment in
LABYRINTH:

THE SYNERGY OF DRUGS AND

INSURGENCY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

FOR

55-56 (2001).
2. See Dan Molinski, Colombian Congress Gets ParamilitaryBill, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 15, 2005, available at LexisNexis Academic (citing AUC's argument that
they should not be punished since they fought against insurgents).
3. See Margarita Martinez, Colombian ParamilitaryChief Warns Talks in Peril,
HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 24, 2004, at A30 (quoting Salvatore Mancuso, lead negotiator
for the paramilitaries until his own demobilization, who told the press that
negotiations were in danger because the GOC was not offering amnesty).
4. Proyecto de Ley de Alternatividad Penal (Penal Alternatives Bill), modified by
Pliego de Modificationes al Proyecto de Ley Estatutaria 85 de 2003, Senado (Colom.),
available at http://www.mediosparalapaz.orglindex.php?idcategoria=1758.
5. According to the GOC, 5181 paramilitaries demobilized between November
2003 and the passage of the Peace and Justice Law in June 2005. See HIGH
REGIONAL STABILITY

COMMISSIONER

FOR PEACE IN COLOMBIA, REPORT ON DEMOBILIZATIONS,

available at

http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/g-autodefensa/dialogos.htm (last visited
August 6, 2005) [hereinafter GOC DEMOBILIZATION REPORT).
6. The Peace and Justice Law reserves to the executive branch the designation of
a facility in which to confine ex-combatants. Ley 975 (Peace and Justice Law), 45.980
D.O., 25 de Julio de 2005 (Colom.), available at http://www.coljuristas.org/
justicia%5CLEY%20975%20DE%202005.pdf. The administration has referred to
"agricultural colonies," which are described in the Prison and Jail Code as lowsecurity ranches or farms without fences. COLOMBIAN COMMISSION OF JURISTS,
BULLETIN NUMBER 6, WITHOUT PEACE AND WITHOUT JUSTICE 2-3 (June 29, 2005),
available at http://www.usofficeoncolombia.org/documents/ccjdemobmemo6.pdf
[hereinafter CCJ JUNE

BULLETIN].
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exchange for their demobilization.7 The law's defenders are probably correct in their assertion that the paramilitaries would not
have accepted stricter penalties and that the law saved the current round of negotiations. Its critics are likewise correct, however, in arguing that the law's leniency and failure to demand
meaningful concessions from the demobilizing combatants in
exchange for the generous benefits afforded to them render the
law unjust and incapable of ridding the country of paramilitaries
permanently.8 These opposing positions, often expressed in terms
of the urgency of ending hostilities, on the one side, and the imperative of justice, on the other, appear irreconcilable: the law's
defenders seem to prioritize demobilization over any other consideration, while its critics, once they concede the strength of the
paramilitaries' bargaining power, must be saying that a continuation of the armed conflict would be better than the situation produced by the current law. The latter position is often coined as a
criticism of the GOC for "purchasing peace at too high a price."9
Little effort has been made on either side, however, to determine
what price Colombians should pay for the disarmament of the
paramilitaries.
This paper attempts to re-frame the debate by evaluating the
new law and punishment options available to the GOC with reference to the costs and benefits incurred to social welfare. Part I
sketches the historical background of Colombia's armed conflict;
the growth and organization of the paramilitaries; and the many
efforts to negotiate an end to hostilities with irregular armed
groups (IAGs). Part II outlines the legal framework governing the
treatment of demobilized combatants in Colombia, including the
new Peace and Justice Law. Part III sets out the basic approach
7. See, e.g., CCJ JUNE

BULLETIN,

supra note 6.

8. Critics note that the emergence of new paramilitary groups (in Valle del Cauca
and Catatumbo) and the "recycling" or demobilized paramilitaries back into the
conflict is already occurring. See Colombia: Justice and Peace Law Will Guarantee
Impunity for Human Rights Abusers, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 26, 2005, http://
web.amnesty.org/libraryIndexfENGAMR230122005; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SMOKE
AND MIRRORS: COLOMBIA's DEMOBILIZATION OF PARAMILITARY GROUPS 44 (2005),
available at http://hrw.orgreports/2005/colombia0805/colombia0805.pdf [hereinafter
SMOKE AND MIRRORS]. See also Rafael Pardo, Key Issues in the Negotiations Process,in
PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA, supra note 1, at 17, 22 (explaining security risk in areas
vacated by demobilizing AUC is not guerrilla reprisals but re-emergence of
paramilitarism).
9. See, e.g., Juan Forero, New Colombia Law Grants Concessions to
Paramilitaries,N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, at A3 (quoting Michael Fruhling, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia saying that Uribe
paid too high a price for disarmament).
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of this paper and provides an overview of the literature from
which the analysis borrows - including transitional justice literature and law and economics approaches to domestic criminal law.
Part IV assesses the Colombian demobilization laws and punishment options in terms of their effectiveness in achieving the goals
of the peace process. Finally, Part V discusses the perceived
externalities of Colombia's punishment decisions and the steps
taken by the international community to compel their
internalization.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Colombia'sArmed Conflict

Colombia, arguably Latin America's oldest democracy and
most stable economy, has been involved in violent conflict for the
better part of the last six decades. 10 The current conflict is traceable to the emergence of guerrilla groups in 1964, after a brief respite from internal conflict was secured by a power-sharing pact
between Liberals and Conservatives in 1958.11 Since 1964, the
conflict has resulted in over 200,000 deaths, mostly of unarmed
civilians, 2 and led to the forced displacement of some 3 million
Colombians.13
1.

Leftist Insurgents

Despite demobilizations of guerrilla groups in the 1980s and
1990s, two numerically significant guerrilla groups remain. The
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is the older and
more powerful of the two with an estimated 9000-12,000 members.1 4 The FARC's income is estimated between $400-800 million
annually, which is derived primarily from the drug trade, as well
10. See Marc Chernick, Negotiating Peace Amid Multiple Forms of Violence, in
159, 162-68 (Cynthia J. Arnson ed.,
1999) (providing brief history of armed conflict from 1960s forward). See also William
D. Shingleton, UnderstandingColombia, 25 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 255,
281 (2001) (calling Colombia the region's "oldest democracy" but noting deteriorating
effects of corruption and violence).
11. Chernick, supra note 10, at 162.
12. Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 1.
13. Juan Forero, Colombia's 3 Million Refugees Hidden in Plain Sight, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/12/weekinreview/
12fore.html?ex=1132376400&en=ed8b623845396469&ei=5070.
14. The U.S. Department describes the FARC as "Latin America's oldest, largest,
most capable and best-equipped insurgency of Marxist origin." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2003 app. B, 133 (2004), available at
www.state.gov/documents/organizations/31946.pdf.
COMPARATIVE PEACE PROCESSES IN LATIN AMERICA
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as from kidnapping and extortion. 5 The GOC estimates that the
FARC takes in five or six times more revenue than it spends, 6
suggesting that it is capable of increasing its military operations,
or that its commanders are accumulating great wealth, or both.
After failed negotiations with the last administration, the FARC
has refused to enter into peace talks with Uribe's team. The
National Liberation Army (ELN) is smaller with approximately
3000 members. 7 The ELN has been essentially defeated and is
18
exploring the option of voluntary demobilization.
2.

Right-Wing Paramilitaries

Paramilitary groups cropped up in Colombia during the early
1980s. 19 In some places, they were financed by landowners and
entrepreneurs to provide protection from the guerrillas, often with
the support of the Colombian armed forces. In others, they were
hired-guns for drug traffickers. In the mid-1990s, the paramilitaries organized themselves, regionally in 1994, and nationally in
1997 in an umbrella group called the United Self-Defense Forces
of Colombia (AUC),2° which today brings together most of the
15. Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorism:Background Questions and Answers:
FARC, ELN, AUC (Columbia, Rebels), http://www.cfr.org/publication/9272/farc-eln
auccolombia rebels.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2005) (estimating FARC's drug income
at $200 - 400 million per annum, representing more than half of its overall income);
Shingleton, supra note 9, at 257 (estimating the combined budgets of the FARC and
the ELN at $100 million per month).
16. Sergio Jaramillo, Atajando el Conflicto, SEMANA (Colom.), available at http:fl
semana2.terra.com.co/opencms/opencms/Semana/articulo.html?id=83861 (last visited
Nov. 17, 2005).
17. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 14, at 129.
18. Although the ELN and the GOC discussed the possibility of negotiation in
2004, even going so far as to agree that the Government of Mexico would facilitate the
process, these talks were cancelled when the ELN refused to stop kidnapping and
otherwise cease hostilities and the GOC refused to suspend these pre-conditions to
negotiations. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, COLOMBIA: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
AND PEACE PROSPECTS 27 (2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/
documents/latinamerica14colombia-presidential-politics-and-political prospects.
pdf [hereinafter ICG 2005 REPORT].
19. Several writers trace the beginnings of paramilitarism to the 1960s, when selfdefense groups were formed and supported by the state to support counter-insurgency
efforts in isolated areas of the country. The GOC officially withdrew its sanction of
self-defense groups in 1989. See PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA, supra note 1, at 2. For
a history of the development of the paramilitaries in Colombia, see generally
MAURICIO ROMERO, PARAMILITARES Y AUTODEFENSAS 1982 - 2003 (2003); LAS
VERDADERAS INTENCIONES DE LOS PARAMILITARES (Alberto Ramirez Santo ed., 2002).
20.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, COLOMBIA: NEGOTIATING WITH PARAMILITARIES

8

(2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latinamerica/
_negotiating-with-the-paramilitaries.pdf.
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country's estimated 15,000-20,000 paramilitaries,2" present in
more than a third of the country's municipalities.22 Like the
FARC, the paramilitaries have a steady income, primarily from
the drug trade, which far exceeds their military expenditures.
The GOC estimates that paramilitary commanders take home
90% of the revenue from drug-related activities.
The prevailing view is that the AUC is an extremely violent
criminal organization, motivated by profit and devoid of political
or ideological aspirations. 24 The U.S. Ambassador to Colombia
labeled the paramilitaries "criminals, narco-traffickers, assassins
and thieves,"25 and a spokesperson for Human Rights Watch
21. It is very difficult to estimate the number of paramilitaries and self-defense
groups outside of the AUC. Michael Taussig explains there are different kinds of
informal paramilitaries: "[T]he local merchant... who decides to go on a killing spree
at night along with his drunk buddies .... " as well as "the goon squads assembled by
large land-owners, and all manner of local self-defense organizations .. " MICHAEL
TAUSSIG, LAw IN A LAWLESS LAND: DIARY OF A Limpieza in Colombia 10 (New York
Press 2003). Further complicating the count, AUC commanders have admitted losing
their troops to non-AUC criminal gangs. See Revelaciones Explosivas, SEMANA
(Colom.), Sept. 25, 2004, available at http://semana2.terra.com.co/opencms/opencms/
Semana/articulo.html?id=82024 (containing a partial transcript of unauthorized tape
recordings of GOC-AUC negotiations).
22. The AUC operates through forty-nine "blocks" in 382 of the country's 1098
municipalities. ICG 2005 REPORT, supra note 18, at 17.
23. The GOC estimates that 80% of the AUC's income is derived from the drug
trade. Ten percent of these funds go to financing military operations. Scott Wilson,
Colombian FightersDrug Trade is Detailed, WASH. POST, June 26, 2003, at A01. An
AUC commander estimates that it costs $5550 to train and equip each combatant and
a further $512 per month per combatant for operational expenses not counting other
regular expenses like payments to widows. Javier Montanez et al., La Verdad Sea
Dicha, in LAS VERDADERAS INTENCIONES DE LOS PARAMILITARES, supra note 18, at 352,
355 (statement of three AUC commanders in response to suggestion by other AUC
leaders that the paramilitaries pull out drug trade).
24. See, e.g., Rodrigo Rojas et al., El Futuro Incierto del las AUC, in LAS
VERDADERAS INTENCIONES DE LOS PARAMILITARES, supra note 17, at 289, 292. Some
analysts argue that the AUC should not be equated to a drug cartel because the
characterization does not account for their vehement opposition to government
negotiations with the FARC or the existence of some paramilitary leaders who
abstain from drug-trafficking (instead suggesting a limited political purpose). See
generally ROMERO, supra note 18. One problem with this argument is that the AUC
has not expressed an ideology - except its opposition to the FARC - nor is it insisting
on any political space or change in the current negotiations. Paul Collier's work on
the economic motives underlying civil conflicts worldwide is helpful in understanding
how illegal armed groups disguise profit motivations behind political or historical
rhetoric.

See, e.g.,

PAUL

COLLIER,

THE

ECONOMIC

CAUSES

OF

CONFLICT

AND

2-4 (World Bank 2000) (explaining difficulty in separating
"greed" from "grievance" motives for conflict because rebels develop grievance
narratives to justify profit-motivated conduct).
25. Colombia's Paramilitariesand Drug Lords, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 2004,
available at http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?storyid=3317964&tran
Mode=none (quoting U.S. Ambassador WilliamWood).
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
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called them "bandits, gangsters and drug-traffickers. 2 6 Few commentators would disagree with their portrayal. The GOC
reported that paramilitaries are indistinguishable from drug-traffickers,27 and even the AUC leadership has admitted that they are
increasingly dependent on the drug trade.28 Moreover, the
paramilitaries have the worst human rights record of any party to
the conflict. They are responsible for the vast majority of crimes
against humanity and deaths, 29 accomplished with unparalleled
brutality, which has not precluded the use of claw-hammers and
chainsaws.30
One caveat to the characterization of the AUC as no more
than a blood-letting drug cartel is that the group has received a
significant measure of support in the countryside." A poll from
December 2004 gave Salvatore Mancuso, the most well-known
AUC commander, a one percentage point lead in approval ratings
over the Minister of Defense. 2 Their popularity distinguishes the
AUC from the FARC, whose approval ratings average 5% according to opinion polls. 3 Comparing perceptions of the two groups, a
1999 poll asked respondents to name the most serious threat to
Colombian welfare: 39% chose the guerrillas, while only 8% chose
paramilitaries (9% chose common criminals). 4
a.

Links to the Colombian Government

Paramilitaries are the "enemies of the enemies" of the Colombian armed forces, 5 and in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the two
26. Kevin Sullivan, DisarmamentHolds Out Hope for Elusive Peace in Colombia,
Dec. 26, 2004, at A36 (quoting Jose Miguel Vivanco, Executive Director
of the Americas Division of Human Rights Watch).
27. See Wilson, supra note 23, at A01.
28. See Montanez et al., supra note 23, at 355; Revelaciones Explosivas, supra note
21.
29. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
30. Juan Forero, Colombia's Gamble: Give a Death Squad Some Big Concessions,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2004, at S.4, p. 3 .
31. See Rodrigo Rojas & Otty Patino, Las Perspectivasde un Proceso de Paz con las
Autodefensas, in LAS VERDADERAS INTENCIONES DE LOS PARAMILITARES, supra note 18,
at 304, 306-07; Scott Wilson, Colombian Militiamen Turn in Weapons, WASH. POST,
Nov. 26, 2003, at A16 (noting that AUC receives political support from "war-weary
population").
32. Popularidadde Jefe ParamilitarSupera Ministro de Defensa en Colombia,
SEMANA (Colom.), Dec. 21, 2004, available at http://www.terra.comlactualidad/
articulo/htmlact188408.htm.
WASH. POST,

33. RABASA & CHALK, supra note 1, at 29.

34. Id. at 56 (citing

COLOMBIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, LA FuERzA PUBLICA Y LOS

DERECHOS HUMANOS EN COLOMBIA

29 (2000)).

35. Wilson, supra note 31, at A16.
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groups cooperated extensively. 6 Under pressure from NGOs and
from the international community, including the U.S. - which
ostensibly conditions its military aid on human rights compliance
- the GOC has taken steps to distance its security forces from the
paramilitaries. For example, the GOC has stepped up military
efforts to kill and capture AUC fighters (between 1997 - 1999,
1.63% of the paramilitary force was killed in action and 12.63%
was captured),3 7 prosecuted officers for collaboration with the
paramilitaries, and dismissed officers accused of human rights
violations.3 8 Nonetheless, there are still credible reports showing
"that certain Colombian army brigades and police detachments
continue to promote, work with, support, profit from, and tolerate
paramilitary groups, treating them as a force allied to and compatible with their own.""
The paramilitaries are gaining political influence in local and
national spheres and have made allies in both houses of the
Colombian Legislature. In regions where the state is absent or
weak, paramilitary leadership replaces the state in the regulation
of economic activity and the provision of security. 0 Locally and
regionally, the paramilitaries heavily influence - by a variety of
means - who is elected into public office.4 1 Top paramilitary commanders have declared that about one in three national legislators are under AUC control. 2 A Congressman put the number
somewhat lower at forty or fifty congressional members (of 265
total) who are believed to be "with" the AUC and reliant on them
for reelection.43
36.

ROMERO,

supra note 19, at 34 - 37.

37. RABASA & CHALK, supra note 1, at 57. See also Rojas et al., supra note 24, at

290-91.
38. RABASA & CHALK, supra note 1, at 58.
39. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE SIXTH DISION: MILITARY-PARAMILITARY TIES AND
U.S. POLICY IN COLOMBIA 1 (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001V
colombia/6theng.pdf [hereinafter MILITARY-PARAMILITARY TIES]. For reporting on
recent instances of cooperation, see SMOKE AND MIRRORS, supra note 8, at 21-22.
40. SMOKE AND MIRRORS, supra note 8, at 16.

41. Id. (illustrating paramilitary say-so over who runs and holds office with April
2005 AUC order to kill Congressman who refused to stop campaigning in certain
region).
42. One top commander estimated that 30% of congressional representatives were
under AUC control, while another commander stated that 35% were "friends" of the
AUC. Juan Forero, Rightist Militias are a Force in Colombia'sCongress, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2004, at A3 ("It is increasingly clear that the political coalition the
paramilitary forces have created is at the apex of its power."); Rojas & Patino, supra
note 29, at 307-08; ICG 2005 REPORT, supra note 17, at 18.
43. Forero, supra note 42, at A3. Some legislators, however, have confirmed the
AUC's estimates. ICG 2005 REPORT, supra note 18, at 18.
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Drugs and the Colombian Conflict

Colombia produces roughly three-quarters of the cocaine sold
globally, along with some heroine,' much of which is sold to the
United States. It is estimated that the paramilitaries control 40%
of Colombia's cocaine trade or more than a quarter of all cocaine
sold in the world.45 Both the FARC and the AUC are heavily
dependent on the drug trade, which provides for between 70 - 80%
of their income.4 6 The linkage to the drug trade largely determines the geography of the conflict, as guerrillas and paramilitaries vie for territorial control of coca-producing land, transport
routes and border areas.47 The groups have the option of either
forcibly taking ownership of the territory"' or establishing control
over its inhabitants. The urge for territorial dominance has pitted
both groups against each other and against the unfortunate
inhabitants of whichever region is caught in the cross-hairs; the
latter are terrorized into allegiance, punished harshly if accused of
supporting the opposing group, and frequently chased off their
land.
B. New Efforts to Stop the Conflict
Colombia started the wave of peace talks with insurgents that
44. See, e.g., Plan Colombia - The Sequel, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 23, 2003, at 28
(reporting that Colombia supplies 70% of the world's cocaine and some heroine).
Eradication efforts show some successes, including a 58% reduction in coca
cultivation between 2000 and 2003. Squeezing the Balloon, Not Popping It, THE
Aug. 6, 2004, available at http://www.economist.com/agenda/
ECONOMIST,
displayStory.cfm?story-id=3079622. However, the trend slowed considerably with
only a 7% reduction occurring between 2003 and 2004. Moreover, there is little sign
of a reduction in supply of cocaine to the United States, suggesting that drug
traffickers may have retained large inventories of cocaine and that new areas used for
coca cultivation may remain undetected. Hand Picked: New Twists in the War on
Coca, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 1, 2005, available at http://www.economist.com/
displayStory.cfm?storyid=4352195.
45. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLOMBIA's CHECKBOOK IMPUNITY (2003), available at
www.hrw.org/background/americas/checkbook-impunity.htm.
46. For a comprehensive analysis of the role of the drug trade in the Colombian
conflict, see generally

RABASA

& CHALK, supra note 1.

47. See Camilo Castilla, Dimensiones Territoriales del Conflicto Armado
Colombiano, in VIOLENCIA, PAZ Y POLITICA EXTERIOR EN COLOMBIA 65, 78-90; RABASA
& CHALK, supra note 1, at 55.

48. The GOC estimates that 40% of the best agricultural land in the country is in
hands of drug-traffickers, including paramilitaries. Juan Forero, Colombia's Landed
Gentry: Coca Lords and Other Bullies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at A4. A Colombian
NGO estimates that the AUC accumulated 5 million hectares of land between 19972003. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLOMBIA: LETTING PARAMILITARIES OFF THE HOOK 5
n.15 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/americas/colombia0105/
colombia0105.pdf [hereinafter HRW 2005 REPORT].
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spread throughout Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s.49 The
GOC negotiated a truce with several guerrilla groups in 1984 and
six separate demobilizations in the late 1980s and 1990s. The
most recent attempt to demobilize the FARC ended badly in 2002
when it was discovered that the guerrillas were using a government-sanctioned "demilitarized zone" to hide kidnapping victims
and to grow and process cocaine. 0 It is widely believed that the
FARC were never interested in a political settlement to a lucrative
war that they were not losing.5 1
In 2002, Alvaro Uribe won the presidential election on a campaign that promised a harder line on guerrillas. His administration has followed a two-track approach to ending the conflict:
wearing down the FARC and negotiating with the AUC 2 On the
first track, the GOC has enhanced the operative and intelligence
capacities of its armed forces by increasing its defense budget,
adding more troops and police, and updating its military equipment. " The administration launched a military campaign, Plan
Patriota, into traditional FARC strongholds in southern Colombia
and pushed guerrillas away from urban centers, bucking the
FARC's announced policy of "urbanizing" the conflict.5 4 The GOC
has also increased police presence in rural areas by establishing
new units in 158 municipalities.5 More controversially, the GOC
has instituted a community watch system in the countryside made
up of "part-time peasant soldiers."56
These efforts are showing some results: the homicide and kidnapping rates have fallen, as has the number of new internally49. See Jesus Antonio Bejarano, Reflections on Colombia, in COMPARATIVE PEACE
supra note 10, at 159, 201.
50. See Wilson, supra note 23, at A01.
51. See, e.g., Chernick, supra note 10, at 166 ("[G]uerrillas' reluctance to negotiate
peace represents their transformation from ideological guerrilla movements into large
and successful criminal enterprises.")
52. See Juan Forero, Haven Offered to 2 Militias in Colombia, If They Disarm,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004, at A7 (explaining GOC strategy to co-opt paramilitaries and
battle guerrillas).
53. See ICG 2005 REPORT, supra note 18, at 12 (noting that the defense budget
was at a historical high of 4.9% of GDP in 2004).
54. See, e.g., Scott Wilson, Colombia's Hit-and-Run War; Rebels' New Tactic
Avoids Contact with Army; Focuses on Cities, WASH. POST, March 27, 2002, at A12.
See also Colombia's Anti-Guerrilla War: Victories But No Waterloo, THE ECONOMIST,
July 17, 2004, at 36 (reporting on successful disruption of FARC's "planned 'siege' of
Bogota" and describing Plan Patriota).
55. You Do the Maths, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2004, available at http:/!
www.economist.com/research/backgrounders/displaystory.cfn?story-id=2335570.
56. Id.
PROCESSES IN LATIN AMERICA,
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displaced persons.57 By keeping the FARC out of urban centers,
the GOC has obstructed their access to food and communication
between fronts.5 While some analysts believe that a switch in the
balance of military advantage will inch FARC commanders to the
negotiation table,59 the FARC has yet to show any interest in talks
with the Uribe administration. Instead, the FARC seems to be
adapting to changed circumstances by ceding territorial control in
its traditional strongholds - where the GOC has concentrated its
counterinsurgency forces - and attacking elsewhere. °
On the second track, the GOC announced its plans to engage
the AUC in peace talks and established a Peace Commission for
that purpose in 2002,61 following the AUC's declaration of a unilateral (and frequently violated) cease-fire. In July 2003, the AUC
and the GOC signed the Santa Fe de Ralito Accord6 3 that outlines
a schedule for full demobilization of the AUC by the end of 2005.1
In July 2004, the GOC granted the AUC a "Location Zone" in
Santa Fe de Ralito, where commanders could reside during the
course of the peace talks without fear of arrest.6 5 The first demobilization of 874 members of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) in
November 2003 cast into doubt the whole process when it came to
light that the paramilitaries had recruited young men from the
57. Id. (reporting 2003 murder rate lowest since 1986; kidnappings down from
2,986 in 2002 to 2,043 in 2003; "new internal refugees caused by the violence" fell to
156,188).
58. See Jaramillo, supra note 16.
59. See generally Castilla, supra note at 47, at 66 (stating that the advantage
gained by armed forces makes negotiation viable). See also Colombia'sAnti-Guerrilla
War: Victories But No Waterloo, THE ECONOMIST, July 17, 2004, at 36 (describing
efforts to push back guerrillas).
60. ICG 2005 REPORT, supra note 18, at 10 ("[Tlhere are no clear indications that
the FARC's capacity to recruit and attack selected military and civilian targets
outside major cities has been significantly weakened.").
61. Resoluci6n 185, 45.046 D.O., 23 de Diciembre de 2002 (Colom.), available at
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/gautodefensa/resolucion.htm.
(instituting the Exploratory Peace Commission and naming governmental delegates).
62. The Colombian Commission of Jurists recorded 1,899 paramilitary killings
from the start of the cease-fire through August 2004. HRW 2005 REPORT, supra note
48, at 4.
63. Acuerdo de Santa Fe de Ralito para Contribuir a la Paz de Colombia, 23 de
Julio de 2003 (Colom.), available at http://www.mediosparalapaz.org/index.php?
idcategoria=2402 (last visited December 5, 2005) [hereinafter Santa Fe de Ralito
Accord].
64. Id. para. 2.
65. Upon opening the Location Zone, the GOC conditionally suspended arrest
warrants for a dozen AUC commanders involved in the talks. See PEACE PROCESS IN
COLOMBIA,

supra note 1, at 4.
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street to pose as AUC members for the duration of the ceremony.'
After a second, smaller ceremony in 2003, the demobilizations
picked up pace (and credibility) in the second half of 2004. By the
time the Peace and Justice Law was passed in June 2005, more
than 5000 paramilitaries had surrendered their weapons and
renounced armed conflict."
1.

Current Talks: What Does the GOC Want?

The GOC gives two justifications for engaging the AUC in
peace talks. First, the GOC argues that their demobilization will
simplify the conflict; 8 in the words of a U.S. official: "It's like taking pieces off the board."69 The second claim is that neutralizing
the paramilitaries will facilitate a political settlement with the
FARC. In the past, the AUC has vehemently opposed negotiations
between the GOC and the FARC.7 0 Given the country's history of
"revenge killings" of demobilized combatants, the FARC has reason to fear that the GOC will not be able to guarantee the security
of ex-guerrillas as long as the AUC still wield power. It is axiomatic in Colombia that as long as there are guerrillas, there will
be paramilitaries; the GOC seems to believe that the reverse holds
true also.
2.

Current Talks: What Does the AUC Want?

The AUC was driven to the negotiating table by new threats
and lured there by the potentially fleeting circumstance of having
powerful allies, or at least sympathizers, in both the legislative
66. Resoluci6n 216, 24 de Noviembre de 2003 (Colom.), available at http://
www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/juridicos/resoluciones/2003/216 2003.pdf
(declaring start of peace talks with the BCN); Santa Fe de Ralito Accord I (declaring a
cessation of hostilities agreement and demobilization of 874 paramilitaries of the
BCN). See Dystopia Disarmed?, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 2004, at 37. See also
Revelaciones Explosivas, supra note 21 (reporting on leaked recording of Peace
Commissioner reprimanding AUC commanders for Nov 2003 demobilization, calling
it a "public embarrassment").
67. As of August 2005, the number of paramilitaries demobilizing subsequent to
the passage of the new law brings the total number up to close to 5800. Molinski,
supra note 2. (reporting on July demobilization of the self-titled "Heroes of Monte
Maria").
68. Wilson, supra note 31, at A16.
69. Wilson, supra note 23, at A01.
70. See, e.g., Colombian Rebels Put on Military Show Ahead of Summit, CNN, Feb.
8, 2001, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001WORLD/americas/02/08/colombia
(quoting letter from AUC commander to president calling for "an end to the joke
which you are subjection Colombians to by your wrong policy of negotiation").
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and executive branches of the GOC. 71 The United States became a
threat to the AUC when it labeled them terrorists 72 and requested
the extradition of a handful of top-ranking paramilitaries on drug
charges. 73 The Colombian armed forces pose an increasing threat
of death or capture, as their willingness to battle the paramilitaries increases in tandem with their military capacity. Unlike the
FARC, who are well-hidden in rural areas, many AUC commanders are landowners or businessmen with more public habits.74 One analyst asserts that any AUC commander could be
captured by the armed forces within a period of six months.75
Finally, AUC commanders have acquired enormous power - politi76
cal and economic - and are interested in laundering their wealth
and legitimizing their position. These motivations translate into a
list of demands that seem to be prioritized roughly as follows: (1)
immunity from extradition; (2) lenient treatment by domestic
authorities; (3) retention of accumulated wealth; (4) maintenance
of capacity (e.g. infrastructure, networks) to continue lucrative
activities; and (5) non-disclosure of information concerning prior
crimes, other combatants or other criminals.
III.

COLOMBIAN LAWS GOVERNING PEACE TALKS

The Colombian legal framework for demobilizations is set
forth primarily in Ley 418 of 1997 (as extended and modified by
Ley 548 of 1999 and Ley 782 of 2002) and Decreto 128, which
together offer most illegal combatants a significant break for voluntarily demobilizing, whether individually or in a group. The
demobilization laws pardon two categories of which all combat71. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
72. The U.S. Department of State designated the AUC a foreign terrorist
organization in 2001. The designation makes it unlawful for anyone in the U.S. to
provide the AUC with material support; requires that all AUC assets be blocked; and
allows the U.S. to deny visas to its members. The decision was based on "numerous
acts of terrorism, including the massacre of hundreds of civilians, the forced
displacement of entire villages." The designation order notes also that in 2000 at
least seventy-five massacres were attributable to AUC members. LAS VERDADERAS
INTENCIONES DE LOS PARAMILITARES,

supra note 19, at 342.

73. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
74. Sergio Jaramillo, La Paz con los Paras es Posible, SEMANA (Colom.), Oct. 2,
2004, available at http://semana2.terra.com.co/archivo/articulosView.jsp?id=82162.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., HRW 2005 REPORT, supra note 48, at 4 (suggesting that failure to

require disclosure of assets acquired by paramilitaries will permit "legalization of the
status quo").

See also Wilson, supra note 23, at A01 (citing GOC report that

paramilitaries are exploiting peace process to protect drug profits and "legalization of
part of their fortune"); Colombia's Paramilitariesand Drug Lords, supra note 25.
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ants stand accused: conspiracy and all crimes of rebellion or sedition.77 The law offers security guarantees to combatants and their
families (nicely coupled with life insurance), urgent care, social
security, educational assistance, income-generating projects and
cash support.78 The pardon is revoked if the beneficiary commits
any crime within two years of demobilizing.79
Prior to the Peace and Justice Law, however, Colombia's laws
did not pardon or otherwise mitigate punishment for atrocities
(serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law), acts of barbarism, terrorism, kidnapping, genocide, and
homicide outside of combat. 0 A Colombian NGO estimated that
the paramilitaries are responsible for 14,000 atrocities.8 It is
obvious why the AUC did not feel it could take comfort in the prior
legal framework. Many of them would be ineligible for pardon and
sentenced to lifetime imprisonment upon surrender to the authorities. The impetus in passing a new demobilization law was the
perceived need to treat all combatant crimes with sufficient leniency to persuade the paramilitaries to demobilize.
The Uribe administration submitted to Congress a first draft
demobilization law in August 2003 to address crimes that were
not pardonable under Ley 418.2 The "Penal Alternatives Bill"
required individual trials and sentencing for any combatant
accused of crimes not automatically pardoned under the existing
demobilization laws." If the combatant committed himself to
meeting all obligations under the proposed law, the President was
empowered to request that his sentence be commuted and he be
released immediately on parole." If at any point in the five years
77. Decreto 128, art. 13, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 45.073 D.O., 22 de Enero
de 2003 (Colom.), available at http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/
documentos/decreto_128_03.pdf; Ley 418, art. 50, 43.201 D.O., 26 de Diciembre de
1997 (Colom.), availableat http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/leyesL0418_97.HTM.
What conduct is included under the automatic pardon is not clear. For example,
during one demobilization, the paramilitaries asked whether killing a FARC civilian
informant was pardonable, and the authorities were unable to answer. Dystopia
Disarmed?, supra note 66.
78. Decreto 128, arts. 14 -20.
79. Ley 418, art. 63.
80. Ley 782, art. 19, 45.043 D.O., 23 de Diciembre de 2002 (Colom.), available at
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/juridicos/ley 782.pdf.
81. De Un Cacho, SEMANA (Colom.), June 18, 2005, available at http://
semana2.terra.com.co/opencms/opencms/Semana/articulo.html?id=87978.
82. Juan Forero, Colombia Plans to Ease Penaltiesfor Right-Wing Death Squads,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at A7.
83. Penal Alternatives Bill, arts. 7-9, modified by Pliego de Modificationes al
Proyecto de Ley Estatutaria 85 de 2003, Senado (Colom.).
84. Id. art. 12.
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following his release on parole, the ex-combatant were to commit a
crime, including a parole violation, or otherwise fail to perform
any legal obligation under the law, the law provided for
mandatory revocation and re-instatement of the full sentence. 85
The law contained two kinds of legal obligation in effect during
parole: compliance with a penal alternative (such as ineligibility
for government jobs, denial of a license to carry weapons, mobility
restrictions to a certain geographical area) and contributions to
reparations (such as monetary payment, public apology, commu86
nity service, truth-telling and cooperation with the authorities).
After five years of good behavior, a judge could declare the ex-combatant a free citizen. 7
Uribe promptly withdrew the draft in response to strident
opposition to its excessive leniency.8 In April 2004, the Executive
branch offered a second version, titled the "Peace, Justice and
Reparations Law," with sentences lasting between five and ten
years, to be served in some kind of institution designed especially
for the task. The new proposal also established more judicial and
administrative manpower to the project of demobilization by setting up a special court, a dedicated prosecutorial unit, and a team
of judges/parole officers tasked with monitoring compliance by excombatants.8 9 Uribe's new proposal not only failed to satisfy most
critics of the prior version, but lost him the support of the
paramilitaries who threatened to walk out of negotiations if the
new terms on "jail" time remained on the table.9 °
Although at least five drafts of the demobilization law circulated though Congress, the debate centered around two of them:
Uribe's proposal and a bill introduced by a bipartisan group in the
Senate. 91 The latter draft, the Senate Proposal, provided for har85. Id. art. 20.
86. Id. arts. 21-24, 29, 31.
87. Id. arts. 18-19.
88. See also Juan Forero, Colombia Proposes 10-Year Terms for Paramilitary
Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2004, at All ("[Pilan prompted a chorus of criticism
from foreign diplomats, the United Nations, human rights groups and some of Mr.
Uribe's own allies .. .

89. Id.
90. The AUC issued a communique outlining their objections to the new draft on
April 14, 2004. Comunicado de las Autodefensas Sobre la Reforma al Proyecto de
Alternatividad Penal, reprinted in EL TIEMPo, April 15, 2004, available at http:l!
semana2.terra.com.co/archivo/articulosView.jsp?id=77846; see also Martinez, supra
note 3 (reporting on Mancuso's warning that peace negotiations threatened by
proposals involving punishment).
91. For a comparison of the two proposals, see HRW 2005 Report, supra note 48,
at 9-15.
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sher sanctions, stricter conditionality and a more explicit focus on
victims' rights to reparations and to participate in the judicial
proceedings.92
The outcome of these congressional deliberations was the
Peace and Justice Law, passed by the Congress on June 22, 2005
and promptly signed into law by President Uribe.9 3 The Peace and
Justice Law does not supercede demobilization laws, but adds to
Colombia's legal framework for demobilization by addressing
those crimes that are expressly excluded from pardon under the
prior laws.
To understand how current Colombian law structures demobilization and judicial process, it is useful to simulate a typical
demobilization. 94 Say the commander of "Block X" wants to demobilize. The AUC negotiators will provide the GOC with a list of
names 95 of those Block X individuals who wish to demobilize with
their commander. 9s Several days prior to the scheduled demobilization ceremony, Block X will gather at a "concentration zone,"
where the fighters will fill-out paperwork; provide dental records,
finger prints, and photographs for later use in background checks;
and receive a demobilization identification card entitling them to
benefits under the law.97 Meanwhile, once the Attorney General's
92. Id. See also Rafael Pardo, Key Issues in the Negotiations Process, in PEACE
PROCESS IN COLOMBIA, supra note 1, at 17, 18-19 (summarizing the Senate Proposal,
spearheaded by Senator Pardo).
93. The law will certainly be challenged in Colombia's Constitutional Court. Some
analysts predict that it will be overturned on grounds that it denies victims their
constitutionally-protected rights. De Un Cacho, supra note 81. Whatever the Court
decides, it is possible that those who demobilize under the Peace and Justice Law will
retain any privileges granted to them. See id. See also SMOKE AND MIRRORS, supra
note 8, at 9 (noting probability that benefits already granted under law would be
permanent as Court's rulings are not retroactive).
94. For an excellent summary of Ley 418 (as modified by Ley 782) and the Peace
and Justice Law's treatment of collective demobilizations, see SMOKE AND MIRRORS,
supra note 8, at 26-28.
95. Aliases are not provided to authorities on this list or at any point in the
process. Human Rights Watch has criticized the GOC for this omission and asserted
that many of those responsible for serious crimes are known to other combatants and
victims only by their aliases. SMOKE AND MIRRORS, supra note 8, at 6.

96. The laws do not require a commander to ensure the demobilization of all
troops under his control in order to be eligible for the benefits under the law. This
feature has been roundly criticized because it leaves paramilitary structures (and
partial manpower) intact while giving commanders a clean slate. See, e.g., CCJ JUNE
BULLETIN, supra note 6, at 2 (criticizing law for failure to require "responsible leader
to make a commitment to demobilize a group").
97. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PEACE IN COLOMBIA,

2004 STATUS REPORT ON

available at http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.
co/desmovilizaciones/2004Jbalance.htm [herinafter GOC 2004 STATUS REPORT].
COLLECTIVE DEMOBILIZATIONS,
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Office (AGO) receives the list of names, it is tasked with conducting a background check to determine whether each fighter
has been indicted or is under investigation or suspicion of
unpardonable crimes. 98
At the ceremony, the demobilizing combatants hand over
their weapons and renounce armed conflict.99 If the demobilized
combatant is cleared by the AGO (which has been the case in the
vast majority of demobilizations to date), he is then free to relocate to wherever he chooses. 10 He will be assigned to a regional
"reference center," which coordinates the remaining judicial formalities, as well as the provision of benefits to ex-combatants in
the region.'0 1 At some later point, the ex-combatant is called to
the reference center to meet with the AGO for an interview, during which he is asked to make a "spontaneous statement"10 2 concerning his prior status as a paramilitary and his knowledge of
any crimes, as well as to hand over any illegally-acquired assets
for the purpose of paying reparations to victims. 3
The spontaneous statement seems to provide an ideal opportunity for establishing a truthful record of the conflict, obtaining
information to dismantle the AUC-linked criminal networks, and
building cases against those most responsible for egregious
crimes. The language of the law suggests that the AGO interrogate the ex-fighter as to his knowledge of crimes. 04 In fact, there
are no incentives for the ex-fighter to "spontaneously" admit to
any involvement or knowledge because there is no penalty for
neglecting to do so, unless the omission is made in bad faith - a
nearly impossible standard to prove according to Colombian
jurists.105 Otherwise, Article 25 provides that if a crime is later
discovered, the combatant may accept the charges, his sentence
98. Peace and Justice Law, art. 16, 45.980 D.O., 25 de Julio de 2005 (Colom.).
99. GOC 2004 STATUS REPORT, supra note 97.
100. As the Peace and Justice Law only targets those accused of unpardonable
crimes, combatants not so accused are pardoned under the pre-existing legal
framework for demobilization. In the case of collective demobilizations, Ley 418
provides for government assistance to demobilized combatants to relocate, including,
in exceptional cases, through application for asylum in foreign countries. Ley 418,
art. 50, para. 3, 43.201 D.O., 26 de Diciembre de 1997 (Colom.).
101.

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PEACE IN COLOMBIA, REPORT ON REFERENCE CENTERS,

available at http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/desmovilizaciones/2004/
index centro.htm.
102. The spontaneous statement, or "version libre," is an unsworn statement.
Peace and Justice Law, art. 17.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See De Un Cacho, supra note 81.
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may be increased by 20% depending on the gravity of the crime,
but his total sentence (for all crimes admitted and those later discovered) cannot exceed the eight-year maximum established by
the law.
Nor are ex-combatants who are cleared after the initial background check interrogated, unless (a) they admit to knowledge of a
crime during their spontaneous statement (this had happened two
or three times according to the Chief Prosecutor as of April
2005)16 or (b) evidence derived from other sources suggests that
the ex-combatant possesses useful information (this had yet to
lead to a single interrogation as of April 2005).1°7 As a result, the
interview is conducted for the purely technical purposes of generating an admission of paramilitary membership by the ex-combatant and a pardon for the crimes of conspiracy and sedition by the
AGO.0 s
Some paramilitaries will not be allowed to go home. When
the initial background check alerts the AGO to indictments,
charges or suspicions of unpardonable crimes, the person so
accused is sent to the Location Zone to await further judicial
action." 9 Given the numbers of massacres and other atrocities
attributed to the paramilitaries as a group, it is remarkable that
analysts predict that only 100 - 200 (1% - 2%) of all paramilitaries who demobilize as a result of the current talks will find themselves in this situation and fall under the new law. 110 At the
Location Zone, the accused is required to provide a spontaneous
statement and to hand over any illegally acquired assets."'
If the AGO wants to press charges against an ex-combatant
for unpardonable crimes, either on the basis of a pre-existing
indictment, investigation or suspicion, or on grounds provided by
the combatant himself during his spontaneous statement, the
Peace and Justice Law imposes drastic time constraints. The
106. SMOKE AND MIRRORs, supra note 8, at 31 (reporting April 2005 interview with
Prosecutor assigned to AUC cases).
107. Id.
108. Unless the combatant references specific crimes in his spontaneous statement,
the Attorney General asks only for the combatant to identify his block, the region in
which it operated and his commander; and provide the date on which he joined the
AUC, his role and his reason for demobilizing. Id.
109. Peace and Justice Law, art. 18, 45.980 D.O., 25 de Julio de 2005 (Colom.).
110. As of April 2005, some 5000 paramilitaries had demobilized and only twentyfive were held at the Location Zone. SMOKE AND MIRRORS, supra note 8, at 4. See also
CCJ JUNE BULLETIN, supra note 6, at 2 (estimating that only 100 will be charged
under the Peace and Justice Law).
111. Peace and Justice Law, arts. 18-19.
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prosecution has 36 hours from the issuance of the spontaneous
statement to press charges for any crimes that may be reasonably
inferred from the statement or from any other evidence then available.112 After pressing charges, the prosecution has sixty days to
bring the case to trial. 13 According to Colombian jurists, the time
constraints are unrealistic even in the context of ordinary crime;
given the volume of potential cases here, their complexity, and the
difficulty in obtaining evidence, the constraints make it almost
inevitable that charges will be brought only against those fighters
who were already under investigation at the time of
4
demobilization.II
If the AGO is able to bring the case to trial, the ex-combatant
may forego the process by accepting the charges,11 5 and so become
eligible for a reduced sentence. Regardless of the degree or frequency of the crimes, the judge must sentence the defending combatant to no fewer than five and no more than eight years.1 6 Up
to eighteen months spent in a concentration or location zone during the AUC-GOC negotiations counts toward the sentence." 7 Excombatant detainees may also be eligible for further reductions for
work or study carried out during confinement."'
Although the Peace and Justice Law appears tougher than
prior executive proposals in that it requires some sort of confession and forfeiture of illegally acquired assets, these new provisions are ineffectual. A combatant who fails to confess to a crime
that is later attributed to him does not lose his benefits, and a
combatant who does not hand over illegally acquired assets loses
nothing if authorities later discover those assets, except the assets
112. Id. art. 17.
113. Id. art. 18.
114. See CCJ JUNE BULLETIN, supra note 6, at 3 (arguing that time periods
provided "to investigate massive and systematic violations of human rights. . . are
absolutely insufficient" and calling proceedings a "sham"); SMOKE AND MIRRORS, supra
note 8, at 8, 52 (calling deadlines "completely unrealistic" and predicting that charges
will be brought only against those whom the Attorney General was already prepared
to prosecute).
115. Peace and Justice Law, art. 19.
116. Id. art. 30.
117. Id. art. 31.
118. It is not clear whether the ex-combatants will be eligible for further
reductions. The Peace and Justice Law purports to exclude these additional
reductions. Id. art. 30. Some legal analysts predict that such an exclusion is
unconstitutional because it violates the equality principle. If ex-combatants may
apply for work and study reductions, the total sentence served for serious crimes may
be little more than two years. SMOKE AND MIRRORS, supra note 8, at 54, n.139.
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themselves. 19 Probably, these new, largely illusory provisions
were traded off against confinement times, which were reduced
from a maximum of ten years in Uribe's second proposal to a maximum of eight in the law adopted by Congress. The executive
branch has yet to designate the location in which these sentences
will be served, but the GOC has suggested that ex-combatants will
be sent to agricultural facilities.
IV.

OUTLINE OF AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO PUNISHMENT
OF COMBATANTS

In the debate surrounding the law, the positions on punishment are often framed in a way to preclude agreement. Those
advocating leniency justify their stance with reference to the
demands of the paramilitaries,12 ° while those pushing for more
severe punishment and stricter conditionality base their position
largely on the moral and legal imperatives of punishing human
rights violations. Expressed in these terms, there is no overlap or
"zone of possible agreement" between the two views. The maximum punishment that the paramilitaries would accept in the
negotiations falls short of the minimum punishment required
under the legal and moral doctrines invoked. This paper attempts
to recast the debate by outlining the goals of the Colombian peace
process, rather than assuming that the overriding aim is the
demobilization of the AUC, and evaluating the punishment
regime provided in the Peace and Justice Law in terms of its
effectiveness in advancing those goals.
A.

Overview of Existing Literature

The paper borrows from writers on transitional justice, a field
that was developed to respond to the legal challenges of political
transitions from authoritarian and military regimes to democracy,
which often involve internal armed conflict. This growing body of
literature is tapped so as to incorporate considerations that are
unique or uniquely significant to post-conflict contexts, but also to
tailor traditional doctrines, like deterrence, to the circumstances
of armed combat and large-scale violations of human rights. The
literature is also useful in that it sheds light on the positions
119. SMOKE AND MIRRORS, supra note 8, at 8 (calling the requirement that
demobilizing fighters hand over their wealth "toothless").
120. The Peace Commissioner, for example, justified leniency with the following
(circular) reasoning: "We have to offer benefits ....
Why? Because we need to
persuade them." Forero, supra note 30, at S.4, p. 3 .
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taken by those pushing for more severe sanctions. "Steeped" as it
is in "moral theory, political theory and science, or highly theorized international law,"12 ' transitional justice literature provides
the vocabulary in which much of the debate is now expressed by
practitioners.
However, the applicability of transitional justice to this paper
and to Colombia generally is qualified in several respects. As a
result of its human rights and international humanitarian law
origin, transitional justice generally deals with crimes carried out
by the state directly or with more state complicity than is the
Colombian case. Likewise, the literature gives more weight to
international legal norms, the role of international courts and the
cross-border effects of punishment decisions than is afforded to
these issues here, where the focus is on Colombian welfare.
On the premise advanced by Posner and Vermeule that doctrines rooted in domestic law can and should be put to more frequent use in the analysis of transitional justice,'22 this paper also
draws heavily from law and economics thinking on criminal law,
particularly from literature relating to plea-bargaining and the
utilitarian justifications for punishment.
B.

The TransitionalJustice Approach to Punishment

On the question of punishment of human rights violations,
transitional justice literature is moving in the direction of more
accountability through more punishment.'2 3 The position is
grounded largely on what many writers see as an emerging duty
to prosecute these crimes under international law, 24 complemented by the notion that surviving victims have certain rights to truth, to reparations, and possibly to retribution - that necessi121. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, TransitionalJustice as Ordinary Justice,
117 HARv. L. REV. 761, 764 (2004).
122. See id. (arguing that transitional justice writers "have gone wrong by virtue of
an insufficient appreciation of the ordinary law of consolidated democracies").
123. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal
Justice Prevent FutureAtrocities, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 30 (2001) (attributing the rise
in accountability to "desire for justice, as well as utilitarian objectives of post-conflict
peace-building").
124. See, e.g., Diane F. Orlentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute
Human Rights Violations of a PriorRegime, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 375 (Neil Kritz
ed., 1995); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Sources in InternationalTreaties of an Obligation to
Investigate, Prosecute and ProvideRedress and Nontreaty Sources of the Obligation to
Investigate and Prosecute, in IMPUNITY AND HuMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PRACTICE 24, 39 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ed., 1995).
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tate punishment.125 Despite the well-established history of amnesties,126 they are now under attack by international and human
rights organizations, diplomats and legal scholars who argue that
they are immoral, illegal or ineffective or all of the above.
Not all transitional writers agree that prosecution is legally
required or optimal in all transitional contexts. 127 The economic

approach, which has enjoyed little popularity among transitional
justice writers, is most frequently invoked to counter the assertion
that prosecution is the appropriate approach to past crimes. 2 ' By
highlighting the cost of prosecution, an economic approach
acknowledges the potential for tension between the goals of justice
and peace, such that where the needs of the latter (defined narrowly as the absence of hostilities) are more pressing, prosecution
may be bypassed.' 29 This challenge to the so-called "prosecutorial
preference" has forced both sides of the debate to buttress their
arguments with forward-loking, utilitarian considerations. A
more rigorous application of the economic approach is found in
Miriam Aukerman's article, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary
Crime,"' which compares prosecutorial and non-prosecutorial
125. See generally Raquel Aldana-Pindell, In Vindication of Justiciable Victims'
Rights to Truth and Justice for State-Sponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1399, 1439-40 (2002).

126. ANDREAS O'SHEA, AMNESTY FOR CRIME IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
22 (2002) (stating that amnesties have been granted in thirty-five countries since the
end of World War II).
127. See, e.g., Carlos S. Nino, Response: The Duty to Prosecute Past Abuses of
Human Rights Put into Context, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 417
(noting that state practice counters notion of emerging international norm to
prosecute); Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 507, 514-21(explaining that
international law provides little textual support for obligation to punish).
128. See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, How Are the New Democracies of the Southern Cone
Dealing with the Legacy of Past Human Rights Abuses, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
supra note 124, at 146 ("[T]he decision to punish or not to punish will depend on a
society's calculus of its future needs.").
129. See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights
Abuses: Of Prosecutionand Truth Commissions, 59 LAW & CONTEMPT. PROBS. 81, 92
(1996) (noting some circumstances where alternatives to prosecution, such as truth
commissions, may be justified by pressing social needs). The trade-off language is
also invoked proposing a non-prosecutorial response. President Uribe answered
concerns about lenient treatment for grave crimes by asserting that for Colombia,
"definitive peace is the best justice." Peter Slevin, Colombian President Defends
Amnesty for ParamilitaryTroops, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2003, at A17. Likewise, a highlevel GOC negotiator stated that the GOC was seeking to "establish an adequate
balance between the interest of justice and the interest of peace." Cesar Sabogal, No
Blanket Amnesties for Paramilitaries,AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE INTERNATIONAL NEWS,
July 2, 2004, available at LexisNexis Academic.
130. Miriam J. Aukerman, ExtraordinaryEvil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for
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responses to grave violations of human rights in terms of their
impact on retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, restorative justice and social solidarity, 131 concluding that prosecution may not
132
be the best tool for peace or justice in certain circumstances.
C.

Goals of the Colombian Peace Process

The peace process refers to the negotiations with armed
actors, but also to "peace-building," meaning "action to identify
and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."3 3 The specific goals
that should be taken into account to determine optimal sanctions
include: (1) to obtain the cessation or diminution of hostilities with
paramilitaries and guerrilla groups; (2) to maximize societal
acceptance of governmental action relating to the negotiations;
and (3) to minimize the probabilities of: (a) a re-emergence of any
demobilized non-state armed group; (b) an emergence of any new
non-state armed group; (c) the employment by non-state armed
actors of warfare tactics that are considered highly detrimental to
the country's wellbeing, including war crimes and crimes against
humanity; (d) commission of common crimes by demobilized combatants; (e) vigilantism; and (f) costs, particularly those.that the
Colombian government must cover from its own purse, i.e., without foreign assistance.
D.

Possible Sanctions

The punishment options that are available to a government in
its design of a sanctions regime for IAGs include: a blanket
amnesty; individual pardons; suspended sentences; alternative
non-monetary and non-confinement sanctions, such as public
shaming or bans on political participation; monetary sanctions;
non-prison privation of liberty; domestic imprisonment; and extradition in applicable cases. In addition, a sanctions regime can:
UnderstandingTransitionalJustice, 15 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 43 (2002) (challenging
"the assumption that prosecutions are always the best way to pursue justice in
societies in transition by arguing that the choice between prosecution and nonprosecution alternatives depends on what one is seeking to achieve").
131. Id. at 45, 53-91.
132. Id. at 96.
133. BouTRos BouTRos-GHALi,
AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY,
PEACEMAKING AND PEACE-KEEPING: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO
THE STATEMENT ADOPTED BY THE SUMMIT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON

JANUARY

1992 11

(UNITED NATIONS

Demobilization:Conceptual Issues, in
(Kees Kingma ed., 2000).

31

1992), quoted in Kees Kingma, Assessing

DEMOBILIZATION IN SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA

23, 25
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vary the punishment for different classes of combatants or crimes;
devise combinations of different sanctions; and trade off options as
part of its negotiations with the combatants. In other words, like
social and economic benefits to combatants, sanctions can be
"packaged" to best meet the goals of the peace process.
V.

EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNISHMENT OPTIONS IN ACHIEVING

PEACE PROCESS GOALS

A.

Cessation of Hostilities

In the absence of an outright military victory, the demobilization of IAGs, and the legal framework that governs their post-conflict treatment, is the result of negotiation. Given that the
paramilitaries' negotiating agenda was primarily, if not exclusively, targeted to allowing them to leave the battlefield without
facing legal sanctions, it is questionable whether such a negotiation could ever be expected to produce agreement on an optimal
level of punishment.
This section starts by analogizing the GOC-AUC negotiations
to both self-reporting and plea bargaining models in the domestic
law context. On assumptions of rational behavior, both models
predict that a socially advantageous agreement can be reached.
Two arguments are developed to challenge the prediction. First,
when the assumptions of rationality are relaxed to reflect psychological biases and agency problems, it seems less likely that the
paramilitaries would have agreed to any offers in the range of
what is reasonable for the GOC. Second, even if the models hold
and negotiations produce outcomes that roughly maintain preexisting deterrence, that pre-existing level may be sub-optimal.
The tentative conclusion is that given the ongoing nature of
Colombia's armed conflict and the limited negotiation goals of the
paramilitaries, negotiated settlement was not a promising route
to the cessation and prevention of hostilities in Colombia.
For simplicity, we assume that there are two possible outcomes to peace talks between a government and an IAG: either
the parties will agree on terms of demobilization and continue to
demobilize or one or both parties will terminate the talks and combat will be resumed.
1.

Application of Models for Self-Reporting and PleaBargaining to Negotiations
Self-reporting occurs when a person who has violated the law
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comes forward to the authorities to report the violation and to submit to the relevant sanctions.13 ' A risk-neutral violator will be
willing to self-report when the sanction with self-reporting is
lower than the expected sanction without self-reporting (the
expected sentence discounted by the probability of escaping detection). In theory, the self-reporting sanction does not need to be
much lower to encourage a rational violator to turn himself over to
the authorities. 13 5 The corresponding marginal loss in deterrence
is likely outweighed by savings on enforcement costs and mitigation of harm,1 36 or its cessation, if the violation would continue
without self-reporting.
Colombia's laws promising leniency to individual combatants
who come forward voluntarily represent an attempt to induce selfreporting.13 7 In the single-combatant scenario, once a fighter identifies himself to the authorities, he is subject to the law as it
stands. Group demobilizations do not fit as neatly under the
scholarship on self-reporting because groups have the option of
coming forward without surrendering to the authorities, i.e., they
can condition their submission to the law on their approval of its
terms.
The negotiation aspect of our issue is better explained by
analogy to plea-bargaining, where the failure to agree on a plea
leads the parties to the battlefield instead of the courthouse. Like
self-reporting, the basic model for plea bargaining theorizes that
the sanction that will be satisfactory to both parties is determined
by the expected sanction without bargaining (the expected sentence discounted by the probability of acquittal).'38 Similar to selfreporting, plea bargaining is considered to be socially advantageous because it produces results that "largely reflect the substantive outcomes that39would have occurred at trial anyway," without
1
the costs of trial.
Stephanos Bibas criticizes the rational-actor model of plea
bargaining for neglecting to account for distortions that can result
in the rejection of reasonable offers. 4 ° A quick review of these dis134. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 522-24 (2004).
135. See id. at 523.
136. See id. at 523-24.
137. See, e.g., Decreto 128, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 45.073 D.O., 22 de
Enero de 2003 (Colom.).
138. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea BargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv.
L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2004).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2464.
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tortions suggests that they are likely to figure prominently in the
peace talks between governments and IAGs, with the result that
IAG negotiators will frequently refuse reasonable offers by their
governmental counterparts.
2.

Distortions that Influence Negotiations

First, the fighters are likely to be overly optimistic about their
chances of escaping capture in combat. Bibas refers to numerous
psychological studies that "show that people are consistently too
optimistic and therefore overconfident in their chances of achieving favorable outcomes.""' Excessive optimism or confidence is
heightened by the perception of having some measure of control
over outcomes,'4 2 which is certainly the case among combatants
contemplating military outcomes.
Although the usual effect of optimism is to inflate expectations, obfuscate the rational calculus of negotiations and hinder
agreement, 143 this optimism may be exploited to favor settlement.
Bibas discusses one avenue for exploitation that emerges in the
domestic context and has a potential application to the Colombian
peace process. In criminal plea bargaining, optimism concerning
favorable outcomes means it is easier for parties to agree on a plea
that is expressed as a charge (with an uncertain sentence to be
144
determined by a judge) rather than as a stipulated sentence,
because the latter arrangement does not allow either side to
145
If
"indulge its over-confidence" to overvalue the bargain.
applied to the government-combatant negotiations, Bibas's insight
would suggest that the government should incorporate more
uncertainty into the bargain to enhance the chances for agreement. The proposition, albeit counterintuitive given a generalized
preference for certainty, 46 has some support in recent develop141. Id. at 2498.
142. Id. at 2501.
143. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Role of Hope in Negotiations, 44 UCLA L. REv.
1661, 1674 (highlighting tendency of optimistic negotiators to over-estimate their
counterparts' reservation price and so walk away from good deals).
144. Bibas, supra note 138, at 2499.
145. Id at 2501 ("The consequence [of excessive optimism] is that the parties prefer
charge bargains to sentence bargains. Scholars have criticized charge bargains as
inferior to sentence bargains because they are less transparent. This opacity,
however, contributes to the allure of charge bargaining, allowing each side to indulge
its overconfidence.").
146. Over-optimism alters combatants' risk perception, but does not tell us
anything about the utility or disutility they derive from taking risks. It is possible for
risk aversion to overwhelm the effect of over-confidence such that a combatant would
not favor an uncertain deal over a certain one with equal, let alone lower, sanctions.
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ments in Colombia. The fact that, prior to June 2005, paramilitaries were willing to demobilize in large numbers without any
certainty as to their legal status is difficult to explain unless we
assume that they are hyper-hopeful for a favorable resolution.
Uncertainty may be introduced in a number of ways. For
example, demobilization laws can give the courts flexibility to
determine the duration of each sentence and the location in which
it is served. The Peace and Justice Law moves in the opposite
direction by establishing a narrow range of confinement terms
and reserving to the Executive the right to designate the place of
confinement. Nonetheless, the practical difficulties in charging
and trying ex-combatants add an element of randomness to the
judicial process that leaves room for optimism. Likewise, possible
sanctions that are outside the control of the negotiating parties
(for example, future exercises of international jurisdiction) generate uncertainty. The optimism hypothesis implies that combatants will accept a bargain with larger expected sanctions than
they would agree to if imposed with certainty.147
A second distortion arises due to the unusually high rates for
discounting future costs (like capture, imprisonment, and death)
that combatants can be expected to apply. Bibas notes a general
tendency to discount future losses more heavily than future gains,
but asserts that some kinds of violators have higher than average
discount rates.14 He links high rates to "impulsiveness," which in
turn correlates with being young, male, low-income and engaged
in violent crime, 149 all of which are characteristic of the paramilitaries.150 This second distortion pushes in the same direction as the
first: combatants may reject reasonable offers if accepting them
means facing immediate losses.
A third distortion that reduces the probability of agreement
on reasonable terms is created by agency problems. In the current
One possible answer is to assume that members of illegal armed groups are risk
preferrers. Bibas cites support for the proposition that recidivist criminals are at
least less risk-averse than the population at large. See id. at 2509.
147. Another source of uncertainty on the bargain side is the possibility that the
offer of lenient treatment will be nullified under a future administration or that it will
be disregarded by a foreign court or international tribunal. See infra notes 250-252
and accompanying text. Combatants would tend to underestimate the chances of
conviction under such circumstances.
148. Bibas, supra note 138, at 2504-06.
149. Id. at 2506-07.
150. See GOC DEMOBILIZATION REPORT, supra note 5 (reporting results from survey
of demobilizing combatants showing that 72% is under thirty years of age, 12.5%
illiterate, 50% has completed the fifth grade and 88% has no assets).
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negotiations, the top fourteen paramilitary leaders are tasked
with representing their own interests and those of thousands of
foot soldiers in their charge. For the purpose of negotiating a
demobilization package, the interests of combatant leaders and
foot soldiers are rarely aligned. On the question of punishment,
for example, the optimal regime is likely to require harsher sanctions for leaders than for the rank and file.' 5 ' A reasonable offer
on this basis might be acceptable to almost all combatants, but
still be turned down by the leadership.
The above discussion suggests that agreement on reasonable
offers is unlikely because combatants will tend to hold out for irrationally good deals, i.e. sub-optimal levels of punishment. The
agreement between the GOC and the AUC on punishment is consistent with this analysis if the deal is, as many analysts contend,
irrationally good for the AUC.1" Agency problems affecting government negotiators help explain a tendency on their part to offer
sub-optimal sanctions. President Uribe's team may have been
willing to make irrational concessions in order to succeed in demobilizing the paramilitaries, a policy that started with the Uribe
administration and has been defended vigorously against the
skepticism of the media, vocal Colombians and the international
community. Having largely staked its reputation on bringing an
end to the conflict, the GOC may be unable or unwilling to cut its
losses as its commitment to the policy is gradually escalated.
Moreover, many of the long-term consequences of excessive concessions at the bargaining table will not materialize under the
current administration's watch. 53
3.

The Sub-Optimality of Reasonable Outcomes

Even assuming that the rational-actor model holds and that
the parties could reach an agreement that roughly reflects the
expected sanctions without negotiations, such an agreement may
not be optimal. The problem arises if expected sanctions without
151. See discussion on limits to deterrence and marginal deterrence.
152. See, e.g., SMOKE AND MIRRORS, supra note 8, at 2 ("[Tlhe Colombian Congress
approved a demobilization law that gives paramilitaries almost everything they
want.").
153. President Uribe's move to amend the constitution to allow him to run for a
second term, starting in 2006, was successful in Congress, but may falter in the
Colombian Constitutional Court. See generally ICG 2005 REPORT, supra note 18.
Successful peace talks with the AUC will help Uribe gain re-election. Id. On the
other hand, if Uribe expects to be in charge for another five years, he should be
expected to take a longer view of the risks generated by over-generous deals at the
negotiation table.
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negotiations are an inadequate measure of optimal sanctions once
we take into account the need to deter future harm. Assuming
that paramilitaries are making a fair living while running a small
risk of capture, incapacitation or death, they will rationally
demand a deal that is more lenient than the GOC should afford.
In other words, even if self-reporting, plea-bargaining and negotiating outcomes roughly maintain existing levels of deterrence, the
GOC cannot hope to use negotiations to increase deterrence, i.e. to
take a tougher stance on combatant crime than it is taking presently. The paramilitaries would never agree to it. Rather than
match the expectations that paramilitaries have concerning the
sanctions that would be imposed absent an agreement, the GOC
may need to change those expectations on the battlefield.
In summary, government-combatant negotiations should not
be expected to result in an agreement on sanctions that reflect the
expected sanctions without negotiation. If an agreement does
result, as it has in Colombia, the result does not provide a conclusive answer to the question this paper seeks to address: how much
punishment should the GOC insist - at the risk of terminating
negotiations - on imposing on the paramilitaries?
B.

Goals Related to Deterrence

The goals of minimizing the probabilities of an emergence of
new non-state armed groups or a re-emergence of existing ones, as
well as decreasing the incidence "common" criminal conduct by
demobilized combatants, can be analyzed under deterrence doctrines. Deterrence refers to the tendency of the imposition of sanctions to deter present and potential illegal combatants from
engaging in the kinds of criminal conduct at issue here. 54 It is
premised on the idea that an individual contemplating the commission of a crime will weigh the benefits of a crime against its
costs, including the expected value of the sanction, which is the
product of its magnitude and the probability of imposition. In this
model, punishment is part of the "price" of a crime facing the prospective criminal so that any increase in punishment works to
decrease his expected return. 155
Deterrence is not necessarily an important consideration to
all peace negotiations. If a government considered a conflict to be
an exceptional event which could be terminated by means a suc154. SHAVELL, supra note 134, at 515-19.
155. See, e.g., CENTO VELjANOVSKI, THE NEW LAW

AND

ECONOMICS 84 (1982).
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cessful settlement, it would be rational to give little weight to the
effect of punishment on potential future violators. But this is not
the case in Colombia, where about one half of the existing armed
combatants are not even at the negotiating table and conditions
for conflict still prevail.
1.

General Deterrence

General deterrence refers to the tendency of potential violators to be deterred by the expected sanctions from engaging in
criminal conduct. 156 The decisions reached in the course of the
GOC's negotiations with the paramilitaries will effect the deterrence of (1) paramilitaries not represented in the talks, (2) members of guerrilla groups, and (3) all persons who may join an IAG
in the future.
a.

Is Combatant Crime Deterrable?

A threshold question is whether the nature of combatant
crimes or the military context in which these are perpetrated precludes application of a doctrine that is premised on rationality.
The least persuasive challenge to the application of the doctrine is
that human rights violators are un-deterrable because they do not
think what they are doing is wrong. In an article on new
approaches to transitional justice, Chandra Lekha Sriram
describes deterrence as being "based on the assumption that the
perpetrator believed or understood that the action was wrong and
expected such wrongdoing would result in negative consequences. "15 In fact, only the latter is necessary for deterrence. 5 8
Sriram's conclusion, that as long as perpetrators believe their
actions are morally right, "then such abuses are un-deterrable,
since potential abusers will see such punishment as unjustifiable"1 59 is flawed for the same reason. To be deterred, it is not
necessary for illegal combatants to behave reasonably; it is only
necessary that they be capable of calculating the costs and benefits of their decisions.
A related challenge is that the horrific nature of the crimes is
156. See SHAVELL, supra note 134, at 515.
157. Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to
Past Abuses, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 301, 394 (2003).
158. One might think it terribly unfair for a police officer to give one a ticket for
speeding given one's mastery over one's car at any speed, and yet still be persuaded to
stay within the limit for fear of that ticket.
159. Sriram, supra note 157, at 394.
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conclusive proof of the perpetrator's irrationality. This might be
wishful thinking. History gives us a handful of crazed
genocidaires (Hitler, for example), but many of the worst human
rights violators are more accurately described as "manipulators,"16 ° who make calculated decisions to commit atrocities. As
Ehrlich argued, "preference for risk, immorality and a penchant
for violence, while increasing the likelihood that a person would
choose to commit a crime under a given set of incentives, do not
necessarily rule out the ability to make self-serving choices."161
Nonetheless, these tendencies do make deterrence harder.
Risk-preference dilutes the threat of future costs; a "penchant for
violence" increases the value of crime to the combatant; and
"immorality" neutralizes the effect of societal norms proscribing
harmful conduct. Combined with the excessive optimism and tendency to discount future costs heavily, these traits require higher
expected sanctions to influence combatants' conduct. In extreme
cases, they may render deterrence unworkable as a practical matter by requiring a higher expected sanction than the authorities
can deliver.
A military context has a blunting effect on a combatant's ability to make rational decisions, which appears negatively related to
the decision-maker's rank. High-ranked combatants can be
expected to make rational decisions because they are able to exercise their will to a larger extent than those under them. A military leader, moreover, is expected to devise strategy that reflects
the costs and benefits of a given course of action; there is no a
priori reason to assume that leaders would not weigh the expected
sanctions for themselves and their troops in their strategic
decisions.
Low-ranked combatants are a different matter. They are
much less likely to act on their own cost-benefit analyses given
that military training and discipline encourage deference to commanders on questions of strategy. This intuition is supported by
the willingness of courts to exonerate foot soldiers from some
crimes under the doctrines of duress and superior orders. In
reviewing a duress defense invoked by a member of the Bosnian
160. Aukerman illustrates the point by noting that while fanatics like Hitler are
probably undeterrable, some leaders like Milosevic are "manipulators, not fanatics,
and might be restrained by credible threats." Aukerman, supra note 130, at 68.
161. Isaac Ehrlich, On Positive Methodology, Ethics and Polemics in Deterrence
Issues, 22 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 124, 127 (1982).
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Serb army, Judge Cassesse of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) noted:
In evaluating the factual circumstances which may be relevant to duress, according to a trend discernible in the caselaw, there may arise the need to distinguish between the
various ranks of the military or civilian hierarchy. [T]he
lower the rank of the recipient of an order accompanied by
duress, the less is likely that he enjoyed any real moral
choice.' 62
Judge Cassesse further cites to an earlier opinion that correlates
lower rank to a greater "sense of compulsion" and observes "that
'
the whole concept of the military is to a certain extent coercive."163
If a combatant lacks "moral choice" and cannot act according
to his own perceptions of right and wrong, he also lacks capacity to
act on his assessment of costs and benefits. Moreover, in a military setting deterrence is countered by more immediate pressures
and incentives. Jaime Malamud-Goti asserts that the internal
structure of military body overpowers external pressures:
Deterrence is unlikely to be effective in cases where military personnel engage in human rights violations. The
threat of a hypothetical conviction does not discourage
criminal behavior within a military body. Immediate and
certain approval from comrades overrides any reason for
complying with legal standards or any fear of the consequences of engaging in criminal behavior. The certainty of
approval and support from comrades and superior officers
neutralizes the deterrent effect of a possible criminal sanction. Approval or disapproval from the military environment is much stronger than rejection from society at
large.164
162. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Joint and Separate Opinion of
Judge Cassesse, 45 (Oct. 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic
appeal/judgement/erd-adojcas971007e.htm. Not all writers or judges agree that
military discipline precludes rational decision-making. A post-World War II judge
observed: "The obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier
is a reasoning agent . . . . It is fallacy of widespread consumption that a soldier is
required to do everything his superior officer orders him to do . . . . " THE

4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, 470-71, quoted in Jeanne L.
Bakker, The Defense of Obedience to Superior Orders: The Mens Rea Requirement, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 441, 446.
163. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T at n.107 (citing R. v. Finta, [19941 1 S.C.R.
701, 838 (Can.)).
164. Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish
State Criminals, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 189, 196. In a different
article, Malamud-Goti emphasizes the peer-pressure exerted by other soldiers,
finding an inverse relationship between the tightness of "bonds of comradeship" - and
EINSATZGRUPPEN CASE,
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Finally, while I argue above that the horrific nature of the
crimes at issue does not reveal a pre-existing inability to make
self-serving choices, continuous exposure and involvement in
these crimes may result in such an inability.'6 5
If foot soldiers are incapable of rational decision-making,
expected sanctions will not deter them from participating in specific criminal acts any more than the prospect of punishment
deters the insane. On deterrence grounds, therefore, it may be
reasonable to forego prosecution of foot soldiers. Perhaps to placate those pushing for more punishment, the Peace and Justice
Law does not formally exempt foot soldiers and they are theoretically at risk of being sentenced to confinement for their participation in unpardonable crimes.
However, the Colombian
demobilization laws create a de facto exemption for foot soldiers
by allowing them to obtain a pardon without confessing their
crimes and through the imposition of unrealistic deadlines on
prosecutorial action. The de facto - de jure gap is unfortunate. If
foot soldiers were granted conditional immunity from their
unpardonable crimes (e.g. by re-defining these crimes to include
an element of instigation, planning, ordering) the GOC could
require them to disclose their involvement and knowledge of all
unpardonable crimes. The law does not require any disclosure at
present. The High Commissioner for Peace has cited the laws
against self-incrimination and duress to explain this odd omission
in the law. 66 Equally plausible, however, is the idea that the
Attorney General could not take tens of thousands of confessions
for crimes that the Peace and Justice Law requires his office to
prosecute. If the GOC does not plan to prosecute foot soldiers, it
lost an opportunity to obtain valuable information from them by
failing to provide formal grounds for their immunity.
Deterrence of foot soldiers may still be possible if it can target
the potential criminal at an earlier point in time, i.e., before he is
engulfed by those circumstances that render him irrational. Consider Shavell's argument that while the defense of diminished
responsibility (e.g. insanity and youth) may be justified under the
deterrence doctrine, "[t]he imposition of liability could induce
therefore the force of peer pressure - and an officer's rank. Jaime Malamud-Goti,
Dignity, Vengeance and FosteringDemocracy, 29 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 417, 423
(1998).
165. See, e.g., Akhavan, supra note 123, at 12 ("Individuals are not likely to be
easily deterred from committing crimes when engulfed in collective hysteria and
routine cruelty.").
166. SMOKE AND MIRRORS, supra note 8, at 57.
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these parties to act differently and thereby reduce dangers over
which they later would have no control."'6 7 A strict approach to
drunk driving illustrates the point: severe penalties designed to
encourage a prospective drunk driver to make alternative transportation arrangements before becoming intoxicated are justified
even if the driver will not be deterred later on.
In light of the above, governments facing internal armed conflict should devise and publicize a punishment scheme for foot
soldiers to deter prospective combatants from joining an IAG.
Whether the decision to join is deterrable depends on the combatants reasons for joining. Those who join because they or their
family members are threatened with bodily harm are virtually
undeterrable, but those who have a grievance against the opposing group are theoretically deterrable and those who join to
improve their financial situation can be analyzed under a
straightforward application of the deterrence doctrine. 1"
In the case of the paramilitaries, the economic motive plays a
large part in the decision to join the AUC.169 In a survey among
the first group of AUC demobilized combatants, nearly one in four
said he had joined the AUC for economic reasons.' ° Likewise,
Humans Rights Watch, after asking demobilized combatants from
around the country why they had joined the AUC, reported: "[T]he
one reason we heard most frequently was that they simply wanted
a job, and the paramilitaries paid better than most."'
Since combatants may not know or believe that they will later
167. Steven Shavell, CriminalLaw and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions
as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1254-55 (1985).
168. Using data from 152 civil conflicts from 1965-1995, Paul Collier and Anke
Hoeffler illustrate an inverse statistical relationship between economic opportunities
available to young men and the risk of internal armed conflict in a society. They posit
that an increase in the opportunity cost of joining and remaining in an IAG reduces
the returns to armed groups. The best evidence adduced is from the Russian Civil
War (1919-1920), where desertion rates were ten times higher in the summer than in
the winter because soldiers worked on their farms during the summer. PAUL COLLIER
& ANKE HOEFFLER, JUSTICE-SEEKING AND LOOT-SEEKING IN CIVIL WAR 4 (1999).
169. Gustavo Villegas, Key Issues in the Negotiations Process, in PEACE PROCESS IN
COLOMBIA, supra note 1, at 32 (presenting and explaining survey results). See infra
note 145 for specific statistical findings.
170. Villegas, supra note 169, at 32. When asked why they had joined the AUC, the
ex-fighters answered as followed: 23% cited economic reasons; 25% claimed revenge
for the death of a family member; 25% cited threats; 7% explained that problems at
home were to blame; and 20% offered other reasons. Id. There is some doubt as to the
reliability of these statistics because many suspect that the AUC recruited "street
thugs" for the demobilization. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
171. SMOKE AND MIRRORS, supra note 8, at 18 (noting that AUC foot soldiers earn
more than per capita GDP in Colombia).
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be coerced into punishable acts, there is a strong argument for
meting out some punishment for merely joining an IAG. In most
post-conflict contexts, it is not feasible to provide large numbers of
combatants with full judicial process or to incarcerate them, but
demobilizing combatants can be required to confess their crimes,
share information and provide community service or a comparable
penalty. Under Colombian laws, any foot soldier who is not
accused of the unpardonable crimes (e.g. violations of human
rights, kidnapping, and homicide outside of combat) is granted a
pardon that is conditioned only on abstention from criminal conduct in the two years following demobilization. 172 In light of cost
considerations and the logic of marginal deterrence, it is impractical to imprison 20,000-40,000 members of Colombian IAGs, but
the existing framework is more lenient than necessary on foot
soldiers who are not required to plea bargain for their pardon by
confessing their crimes and providing information to the
Government.
b.

Influencing Combatants'Assessment of Sanctions

The magnitude of sanctions imposed on demobilizing combatants enters into the deterrence calculus of non-demobilizing combatants indirectly. Because the combatant has control over the
probability that these particular sanctions will be applied, a belief
that he will never volunteer to demobilize lowers the probability of
their imposition to zero. It follows that there is a cut-off level of
severity (subject to personal preferences and circumstances) above
which a combatant will cease to consider voluntary demobilization
as an option because he perceives the sanctions to be larger than
those he risks as an active combatant. Theoretically, any increase
in sanctions above that level would have no additional deterrent
effect. The GOC can affect a change in the combatants' cut-off
level only by increasing the expected sanctions without an agreement, i.e., by capturing more combatants and/or punishing them
more severely.
Reaching that critical level of severity would affect incentives,
however. It would produce the same result as if the GOC made a
172. Ley 418, art. 63, 43.201 D.O., 26 de Diciembre de 1997 (Colom.). Given the
paramilitaries' human rights record, it seems likely that a sizable number of foot
soldiers are guilty of crimes that are not officially subject to pardon. However,
considering the fact that the law does not require a confession together with the
severe time constraints on the prosecution for pressing charges (thirty-six hours) and
bringing the case to trial (sixty days), the safest bet is that foot soldiers will be free to
go.
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credible declaration that it would never again negotiate with
armed actors. Essentially, it removes one possible outcome for
combatants. On a list possible final outcomes to participation in
an armed group, as perceived by a person who is thinking about
joining one, voluntary demobilization is likely to be less negative
than most others (e.g. death, incapacitation, capture by an opposing armed group or the military) and less positive than only one
(victory). All else being equal, taking voluntary demobilization off
the menu should decrease the expected value of participation. In
fact, refraining from negotiating an easy out for combatants may
to the GOC to deter people
be the most powerful tool available
17
from joining armed groups. 3
c.

Special Occasion Leniency

Considering the benefits to Colombian welfare of ending hostilities with the paramilitaries, it is worth asking the deterrence
question from another angle. It is granted that more severe sanctions would be ideal, but, unfortunately, circumstances in postconflict societies are far from it. So the more appropriate issue
may be how much deterrence is sacrificed when the GOC underpunishes the paramilitaries. In theory, if an authority establishes
a rule of leniency that applies only to the exact circumstances of a
specific, unrepeated situation, that rule would generate no deterrent effect whatsoever. The fact that a car owner is not penalized
for failing to pay a parking meter on Sundays does not make her
less likely to pay a meter on Mondays. Likewise, a one-time-only
offer by a local library to receive all books without requiring the
payment of any late-return fines should not lead a borrower to be
late in returning books once that offer expires.
In practice, amnesties of this sort can weaken the deterrent
effect of the existing regime as U.S. experience with tax amnesties
has borne out. The first issue is one of credibility - the ability of
the authorities to persuade potential law-breakers that the
amnesty is a unique event. No one imagines that the Sunday rule
for parking meters might be extended to Mondays; the rule's clar173. Of course, the effect on current combatants is to disincentivize their voluntary
demobilization. One speaker to the Colombian Congress proposed that the GOC offer
lenient treatment (but not an amnesty) to combatants for a limited period of time
with notice that, upon expiration, no further negotiation would be possible. The
problem, as noted by that speaker and in the above discussion on amnesties, is
credibility. Miguel Posada Samper, Statement Before the Peace Commission of the
Colombian Senate, Jan. 30, 2004, available at http://www.verdadcolombia.org/
archivos/VerArticulo.php?Id=47.
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ity and consistent application make its uniqueness believable.
The history of GOC negotiations turns up half a dozen amnesties
in the last fifteen years alone. 174 If the potential (first-time or
recidivist) lawbreaker does not believe that a given amnesty is the
last one to be offered, the announcement of an amnesty is likely to
result in an upward adjustment in his probabilistic beliefs concerning future amnesties. As one writer explains, with respect to
tax amnesties, one problem is that "repeatedly resorting to them
causes them to be rationally anticipated by citizens, adversely
affecting ex ante deterrence."'7

5

The second issue concerns the sig-

nal given by the authorities to potential lawbreakers. When the
GOC goes easy on combatants, it signals its eagerness to strike a
deal, 176 which diminishes its bargaining position. Moreover, if everyone knows that amnesties create a problem down the line, the
authorities are simultaneously signaling their own high discount
rates. 177

2.

Specific Deterrence

Specific deterrence refers to the tendency among individual
criminals on whom sanctions have been imposed to refrain in the
7
future from the criminal conduct that gave rise to the sanctions. 1
It is implicated in the Colombian peace process by the high rate of
recidivism among ex-combatants who frequently re-join their old
group or find new ones after officially demobilizing.'79
174. See Chernick, supra note 10, at 174-85, 196-99.
175. Arindam Das-Gupta & Dilip Mookherjee, Tax Amnesties as Asset-Laundering
Devices, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 408 (1996) (discussing the problem of anticipated
amnesties in the context of tax payment).
176. An analogous point on signaling in the tax context is that amnesties signal
government's auditing costs. Auditing and combat both represent the government's
means of detection and capture of violators. See Id.
177. This insight is also drawn from literature on tax amnesties. See Eric Posner,
The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1800-01, 1813 (arguing that
amnesties should be avoided because they favor short-term over higher, long-term
revenues and by relying on them, the government signals high discount rates). See
also Das-Gupta & Mookherjee, supra note 175, at 422 (stating that amnesties signal
government's auditing costs).
178. See SHAVELI, supra note 134, at 515.
179. ICG 2005 REPORT, supra note 18, at 19 (reporting that some paramilitaries
join gangs after demobilizing). Surprisingly, some AUC members previously belonged
to a guerrilla group; they are thought to join the AUC for protection from their former
group or on account of the higher salaries offered to paramilitaries. See Dystopia
Disarmed?, supra note 66, at 37. Human rights groups report paramilitary and gang
recruitment efforts targeting demobilized AUC members. SMOKE AND MIRRoRS, supra
note 8, at 45 (citing interview with ex-combatant who reports that recruiters hang out
near the demobilization reference center).
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Specific deterrence comes into play when the imposition of
sanctions results in an upward adjustment in the criminal's perception of the probability or magnitude of sanctions. 8 0 In the context of a negotiated settlement, the authorities have limited
control over the probability variable given that the imposition of
sanctions is largely at the discretion of combatant leaders. As
applied to leaders, then, it is not very useful to retain a separate
value for the probability of sanctions. Foot soldiers, on the other
hand, would face a higher probability if the demobilization laws
required commanders to account for all their troops in order to
obtain demobilization benefits. Despite the insistence of human
rights organizations, the international community, and a sizable
8 1 that paramilitary leaders
group in the Colombian Congress"
ensure the demobilization of all troops in their command, the final
version of the Peace and Justice Law does not include this requirement, assuaging any fears of rank-and-file combatants that their
commanders will turn them over to the authorities.
With regard to the expected magnitude of sanctions, combatants likely expect zero or purely symbolic sanctions given the
GOC's prior treatment of demobilizing combatants. The imposition of almost any sanction will increase this value and enhance
deterrence.
a.

Deterring Common Crime by Ex-Combatants

Post-conflict societies often witness an increase in common
crime, attributable in part to the demobilization of combatants." 2
Many former fighters are unable to find legal employment in wartorn economies, lack job skills and are "psychologically accustomed to danger and violence;" all of which contribute to a ten180. See SHAVELL, supra note 134, at 516-17.
181. The Senate Proposal, for example, would require that benefits be provided to a
group rather than to individuals such that a commander's eligibility under law would
be conditioned on the demobilization of all troops under his control. See also Pardo,
supra note 8, at 17, 19 (describing flexibility to demobilize individually or in a group
as "loophole" in the law).
182. George R. Vickers, Renegotiating Internal Security, in COMPARATIVE PEACE
PROCESS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 10, at 389, 399. Vickers observes that the
post-conflict situations in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua were all
characterized by economic crisis, unemployment and increased crime, attributing
crime to "bad economic conditions and a plentiful supply of guns and people who know
how to use them." Id. See also Charles T. Call & William Stanley, Protecting the
People: Public Security Choices After Civil Wars, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 151 (2001)
(noting increased violent crime and perceived deterioration in security in aftermath of
civil wars in 1980s and 1990s).
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dency to engage in crime. 8 3 In the context of the ongoing

demobilization of the AUC, reports are already emerging showing
a return to crime and violence among some ex-fighters. 184
The obvious way to deter demobilized combatants from committing common crime is to increase the probability and magnitude of sanctions that apply to those future crimes. Parole
arrangements can increase both values through increased monitoring and the threat of reinstatement of whatever portion of the
prior sentence was not served. Given that the deterrent potential
of a parole sanction is a product of probability (monitoring) and
magnitude (sentence to be reinstated plus new charges), societal
welfare is better advanced by enhancing the magnitude of sanctions because it costs less. This may be accomplished in two ways:
(1) assessing larger penalties at the sentencing phase, commutable or pardonable on the condition that parole is not violated, or
(2) decreasing the portion of the sentence served. 85
3.

Marginal Deterrence

Combatant crime is a bundle of criminal acts ranging from
conspiracy to commit crime to massacre of civilians. The theory of
marginal deterrence suggests that the GOC could create a punishment regime that would deter combatants - who will not be
deterred from becoming or remaining combatants - from committing those crimes that it deems most harmful by imposing more
183. See Call & Stanley, supra note 182, at 154. A survey of ex-combatants from
the November 2003 demobilization of the BCN suggests that more than half of those
combatants had been involved in criminal activity or armed combat prior to joining
the BCN. Villegas, supra note 169, at 32.
184. For example, forty-nine ex-fighters had been killed (as of March 2005) and
twenty-eight had been arrested (as of April 2005). ICG 2005 REPORT, supra note 18,
at 23 n.237. There are also reports that demobilized paramilitaries have been
recruited into gangs. Id. at 19.
185. This line of reasoning does not suggest that conditional pardons and
commuted sentences are superior, for deterrence purposes, to the imposition of full
prison terms. There is no evidence showing that the high rates of recidivism/common
crime among ex-combatants would hold true if they served prison sentences of
standard duration. Caution beyond whatever is warranted by the release of any
convict may be unnecessary. The fact that the GOC will lose leverage over released
combatants who have served all or most of their sentences may be compensated by
their incapacitation during the period in which they posed the largest risk. It is not
necessary to endorse a rehabilitative view of Colombian prisons to argue that an excombatant released in ten or twenty years is more likely to behave like an ex-convict
than an ex-combatant. The criminal networks that remain in post-war contexts may
have broken down, the combatant may have lost touch with former comrades and,
more generally, the post-war "crime waves" discussed above, supra notes 181-182, will
have subsided in many cases.
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severe sanctions for more severe crimes.186 Suppose, for example,
that the GOC ranked combatant crimes in the following descending order of gravity: massacres of civilians, murders of civilians,
sexual violence, destruction of infrastructure, forced displacement
of civilians, drug-trafficking and participation in an illegal armed
group.'8 7 The GOC could then create an incentive structure that
would persuade a leader who wants to clear a tract of land of its
inhabitants to achieve his goal by threatening the residents rather
than killing them. Such a structure would require an appreciable
difference in the sanctions imposed for either crime. Slight differentiation is unlikely to do the trick. 8 It would be necessary to
establish as broad a spectrum of sanctions as possible, reserving
the most severe (life imprisonment under Colombian law) for the
worst crimes and reducing the sanction with each lesser crime.
One problem with establishing such a structure is that, at
some point on the list, the sanction assigned to a crime will be
insufficient for deterrence. 8 9 If ordering a massacre is punished
with lifetime imprisonment, where does that leave drug trafficking? 9° In fact, given that targeting leaders may be more effective
in reducing the incidence of harmful crimes, the government will
spend most of its sanctions "capital" on crimes committed by leaders (instigating, planning and ordering gross violations) and may
not have much to dole out when it gets to the crimes committed by
the rank and file.
The Colombian demobilization laws leave little room for marginal deterrence. Between pardonable and unpardonable crimes
186. See SHAVELL, supra note 134, at 518-19.
187. A proposed order is provided here for illustration purposes only.
188. In fact, the punishment differential often must be capable of more than
offsetting the direct benefits to the combatant of committing the additional crime.
Analogous to a scenario in domestic crime where a bank robber may murder a witness
to reduce the probability of capture for the bank robbery, combatants may perceive
higher-ranked crimes as improving their chances of victory or at least strengthening
their hand at the bargaining table with the GOC.
189. SHAVELL, supra note 134, at 519 ("For the schedule of sanctions to rise steeply
enough to accomplish marginal deterrence, sanctions for less harmful acts may have
to be so low that individuals are not appropriately deterred from committing these
acts.").
190. Note a particular problem that arises when devising a penalty schedule for a
specific population: to preserve the marginal deterrence effects, the penalty for drugtrafficking may need to be much lower than it is for drug traffickers who are not
combatants. This creates perverse incentives that have already encouraged drug
dealers to become combatants in recent months. See infra note 177 and
accompanying text. The unequal treatment of combatants and non-combatants for
comparable crimes also creates a problem for the GOC in obtaining societal approval
for its management of the negotiations.
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there is a steep step from zero to five years of confinement; 191 but
within the category of unpardonable conduct, the five-year floor
and eight-year ceiling on sentences'92 render difficult any differentiation between perpetrators according to the specific nature of
the unpardonable crimes or the number of instances of criminal
conduct.
4.

Monetary Sanctions

Monetary sanctions have come up in two contexts in the
development of the Peace and Justice Law. First, Uribe's original
proposal would have allowed for paramilitaries to pay a monetary
fine in lieu of jail time.'93 Human rights groups bristled,' and
their position finds support in the deterrence doctrine: the gravity
of the crimes combined with the fact that the vast majority of
demobilizing paramilitaries are judgment-proof 95 (and those who
are not are probably drawing wealth from profits accrued through
criminal activity) precludes reliance on monetary penalties for
deterrence.
Second, the Peace and Justice Law adopted a provision from
the Senate Proposal that requires combatants to hand over all
assets acquired through criminal activities.'96 However, similar to
the provision concerning "spontaneous statements," the
mandatory language used is not buttressed by any penalty for failing to hand over assets.'97 If the GOC is able to prove that some
unreported asset was acquired illegally, the combatant will be
forced to hand that asset over. In fact, that the AUC accepted a
provision for forfeiting ill-gotten gains is only understandable in
light of the ease with which the provision can be ignored.
191. The crime of conspiracy and all crimes of rebellion or sedition are pardoned
under Decreto 128, Ley 418 and Ley 782. Crimes that are not eligible for such pardon
are addressed by the Peace and Justice Law, which imposes a minimum sentence of
five years. Peace and Justice Law, art. 30, 45.980 D.O., 25 de Julio de 2005 (Colom.).
192. Id.
193. Penal Alternatives Bill, art. 19, modified by Pliego de Modificationes al
Proyecto de Ley Estatutaria 85 de 2003, Senado (Colom.) (granting immediate parole
to combatants who comply with the law); Id. art. 24 (listing financial contributions to
victims and social organizations as peace-favoring acts that qualify combatant for
immediate parole).
194. Human Rights Watch derided the proposed law as offering "checkbook
impunity."
HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLOMBIA'S CHECKBOOK IMPUNITY (2003)
availableat www.hrw.org/background/americas/checkbook-impunity.htm.
195. See GOC DEMOBILIZATION REPORT, supra note 5 (reporting survey results
showing 88% of former fighters have no assets, only 3% have a home).
196. Peace and Justice Law, art. 10.2.
197. See id.
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A reasonably well-enforced forfeiture provision would be a
beneficial complement to other sanctions provided for in the
Colombian demobilization laws. As previously noted, commanders
have made a fortune from the drug trade. To get a rough sense of
the numbers, consider that paramilitaries are thought to control
40% of the country's cocaine sales and that in a single year (1999)
Colombia exported 520 metric tons of cocaine, which were sold at a
market price of $100 per gram for gross revenues of $52 billion.
Although these revenues are distributed through long production
and distribution chains, AUC commanders are thought to take
home 90% of whatever cut goes to the paramilitaries. 15 The AUC
is also involved in other lucrative activities, including the sale and
smuggling of contraband (such as stolen gasoline and arms),
extortion and usurious money lending." Its members have accumulated vast tracts of land,"' livestock, homes and small
businesses. °1
Assuming, for simplicity, that all paramilitaries came into the
conflict without wealth, monetary sanctions can do nothing more
than "disgorge" profits generated by the criminal activity, thus,
even if perfectly implemented, leaving the injurer indifferent
between committing the crime and refraining. 0 2 Robert Cooter
and Thomas Ulen express the prevailing wisdom: "In general,
thieves cannot be deterred by the requirement that they return
20 3
what they have stolen whenever they happen to get caught."
One problem with the thief metaphor is that it fails to capture
the organizational aspects of the paramilitary network, which are
designed to facilitate the execution of a bundle of crimes, including
some high-profit crimes and some high-harm crimes, that may not
perfectly overlap. It is useful here to focus on the organization as
the target of deterrence rather than the individual. Liza Vertin198. Wilson, supra note 23, at A01 (citing GOC report).
199. SMOKE AND MIRRORS, supra note 8, at 15.
200. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
201. In a December demobilization, the AUC voluntarily handed over assorted
assets that illustrate their diversified portfolio, including 105 ranches, 58 houses, 45
mules, 10 houses and some small businesses like pool halls. See Sullivan, supra note
26, at A36. The Organization of American States, which is observing/facilitating the
negotiations, has suggested that the "loot" be given to victims and family members.
Loot Is Given Up by Colombian Militias,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at A3. As of June
2005, no other demobilizing block had turned over assets. SMOKE AND MIRRORS, supra
note 8, at 45.
202. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMics 432 (3d ed.
2000) (defining "perfect disgorgement" as the amount that "leaves the injurer
indifferent between the injury with disgorgement and no injury").
203. Id. at 434.
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sky's work on criminal gangs (defined as a group of members who
work together repeatedly, under a common set of rules, and who
share group assets to carry out profitable crime) is instructive." 4
The law and economics approach she employs to explain the deterrent effect on criminal gangs differs from the traditional "Becker"
approach in that she focuses on the "organizational structure of
the production unit rather than on individual decision-making."2 "'
On the question of the deterrent potential of disgorgement in
the context of the AUC, Vertinsky's work on U.S. gangs offers the
following insight: "The basic idea is that where gangs engage in a
range of different activities, some of which are more harmful than
others, it may be possible to exploit their interest in protecting one
set of activities to reduce the level of other activities. 2 6
To the extent that paramilitaries and other IAGs are motivated to make money from the drug trade and other illegal activities, disgorgement as a penalty for the indiscriminate killing of
civilians could be a powerful incentive to find new, less violent
ways of doing business. If this is true, disgorgement and other
forms of punishment (including imprisonment) could be traded off
without sacrificing the level of deterrence of the most harmful
crimes.
This conclusion may raise eyebrows - so it is important to
note that the deterrence of drug trafficking is not at stake here.
The prior demobilization framework in Colombia, which relied on
sanctions other than disgorgement, was not effective to deter drug
trafficking. The best evidence of this is that a number of Colombian kingpins have signed up as paramilitaries since the demobilization began; one went so far as to purchase an AUC front (or
franchise) and take on a nom de guerre.2 7 Also telling is the assertion by government officials from Colombia and the U.S. that AUC
drug trafficking has not abated during the period of AUC-GOC
negotiations.2 0 Extradition is a deterrent to drug trafficking, but
the GOC appears willing to give commanders immunity from
204. LIZA VERTINSKY, A LAW AND ECONOMICS A'PROACH TO CRIMINAL GANGS 111
(1999).
205. Id. at 178-179.
206. Id. at 32.
207. Colombia's Paramilitariesand Drug Lords, supra note 25 (reporting that
kingpin on the FBI's most wanted list recently bought an AUC block for $5 million).
208. See Forero, supra note 9, at A3 (quoting U.S. counter-narcotics officer's
statement: "If you ask me whether we have heard of a reduction of drug trafficking by
those very people who were sitting at the negotiating table, I would say, 'No.'").
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extradition in exchange for other concessions.0 9 If disgorgement
works as posited above it will incentivize paramilitaries to act less
like paramilitaries and more like a garden-variety cartel, which
would subject them to the same legal risks faced by non-AUC drug
traffickers, but would in no way dilute the deterrent effect of
Colombian and international counter-narcotics efforts.
The disadvantages of disgorgement over imprisonment
include the failure to fulfill societal preferences for retribution and
fairplay, the deterioration in the rule of law, and the disapproval
of the international community. The advantages center on cost
considerations - monetary sanctions are less costly to enforce than
prison sanctions and the funds, as foreseen in the Peace and Justice Law, will bankroll reparations to victims. 2 0 The transfer of
money from the violators to their victims could create more utility
than a governmental transfer of the same amount of money to the
same recipients. This is because the utility of reparations turns
on questions of perception. It seems fairer that the money be
taken from the pockets of wrongdoers. Also, by paying up, violators appear to be both acknowledging their culpability and beginning to make amends.
C.

Societal Preferences

A government involved in peace talks should give weight to
the preferences of its citizens 211 in the design of sanctions because
(a) the fulfillment of those preferences has a direct, positive effect
and (b) popular approval of the government's handling of the
negotiations puts the peace process on more solid footing and may
strengthen the rule of law.
1.

The Desire for Retribution

On the question of punishing combatants, many Colombians
can be expected to want the paramilitaries to be treated severely.
209. See infra notes 246-264 and accompanying text.
210. Articles 43 - 45 of the Peace and Justice Law entitle victims to demand
reparations from wrongdoers, if these wrongdoers are held liable for the crimes that
caused the victims' injury; or from a state-managed fund, if the wrongdoer cannot be
identified or if he is not subjected to judicial process. Peace and Justice Law, arts. 4345, 45.980 D.O., 25 de Julio de 2005 (Colom.).
211. It is not uncommon for criminal justice systems to incorporate societal
preferences into the choice of sanctions. For example, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
allow for "the community view of the gravity of the offense" and "the public concern
generated by the offense" to influence sentencing decisions. Title 28, Judiciary and
Judicial Procedure, Part III, Chapter 58, U.S. Sentencing Commission, Section 994
(b)(2)(c)(4) and (5). See generally Aldana-Pindell, supra note 125.
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Punishment provides satisfaction of that desire and serves as a
kind of private remedy to victims.2 12 This justification for punishment coincides with, but is conceptually distinct from, Kantian
retribution. While the latter values punishment for its own sake
on the basis of moral culpability or "just desserts,"2 13 the notion
advanced in the former is "goal oriented retribution," which values
the benefits that punishment generates for victims and third
parties.2 14
Shavell observes that the desire for retribution is likely to be
strongest as a response to serious crimes and among those most
harmed by the conduct.2" 5 Empirical data from post-conflict cases
supports this intuition. The desire for retribution is a powerful
emotion among the surviving victims and family members of victims of gross human rights violations. 21 6 Raquel Aldana-Pindell
studied cases brought by victims to international courts when
their governments failed to prosecute their victimizers to show
"the anguish suffered by surviving victims of gross human rights
violations that result [sic] from the lack of effective
prosecutions."217
In Colombia, paramilitaries and guerrilla fighters are suspected of indiscriminate killing of unarmed civilians, including
children, sexual violence, forced recruitment of minors and kidnapping - in short, crimes that almost all societies condemn as
among the worst. Moreover, a large percentage of Colombians
have been harmed in some relatively direct way by the crimes
committed. 21 ' As a result of the heinous and pervasive nature of
the combatants' crimes in Colombia, the desire for retribution can
be expected to push strongly for harsh sanctions.
212. Id. at 1445-1446.
213. For a good discussion on the differences between backward-looking retribution
and retributive motives based on the desires of victims of human rights violators, see
id. at 1445-51.
214. Malamud-Goti, supra note 164 (rejecting pure retribution and utilitarian

justifications for punishment in favor of goal-oriented variant whereby victims are
redressed by punishment). See also Roht-Arriaza, supra note 124, at 16-18.
215. SHAVELL, supra note 134, at 537.
216. See, e.g., Aldana-Pindell, supra note 125, at 1444 n.245 (citing surveys
conducted in former Yugoslavia in late 1990s showing that over 90% of the population

wanted perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity to be sentenced to
death or lifetime imprisonment).
217. Id. at 1414.
218. Some numbers may be useful to get a sense of the pervasive nature of the
Colombian conflict. See supra notes 1, 12-13 and accompanying text.
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Fairplay

Social preferences relating to justice often call for fairplay,
meaning that sanctions should be roughly equal for the same
crime (with allowances for criminal records, etc.) and roughly proportionate to the harm produced.219 One of the recurring criticisms of amnesties emphasizes the irony of punishing a
pickpocket more harshly than a genocidaire. 2 ° The concern here

has less to do with differentiating among combatants as it does
with establishing some semblance of equal treatment under the
laws for combatants and common criminals. In other words, a
Colombian is unlikely to disapprove of the GOC's decision to punish a FARC terrorist less or more severely than an ELN rapist as
long as both are punished substantially more than a joy-riding
teenager or a shoplifter. Disutility is created when society feels
that the government is acting unfairly.
3.

The Role of Condonation

To the extent that a government pursues retributive goals as
a means of advancing its citizens' preferences, the rationale for
retribution would be undone if those citizens preferred leniency.
Further, the erosion of public confidence and rule of law - which is
a foreseeable result of failing to apply the laws consistently - is
avoided, at least in part, when
the government's course of action is
221
backed by a broad majority.

It is hard to get a read on popular sentiments concerning the
punishment of paramilitaries. Anecdotal evidence points in two
219. See, e.g., Aldana-Pindell, supra note 125, at 1450 ("[O]n the scale of
punishment . . . more wicked crimes should receive

proportionately greater

punishment than less serious offenses.").
220. The irony is discussed in Colombia with reference to extradition, which in
combination with a lenient regime for paramilitaries means that drug-traffickers will
be punished more severely than instigators of massacres. See, e.g., Antonio Caballero,
Los Colados, SEMANA (Colom.), May 7, 2004, available at http://semana2.terra.com.co/

archivo/articulosView.jsp?id=78550.
221. Some writers argue that popular support is a necessary condition of
amnesties. See, e.g., Carlos Villavicencio, Why PerpetratorsShould Not Always Be
Prosecuted: Where the InternationalCriminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet, 49
EMORY L.J. 205, 216 (requiring "convincing evidence that the majority of citizens
freely endorsed the transitional justice policy adopted by the states" before
considering the legitimacy of non-prosecutorial approaches). Some of the erosion to
rule of law will occur regardless of public acceptance. The sentiment is not approval
in a purely positive sense, but resignation to the limits of the government in Colombia
to provide its citizenry with a better solution. A preference for leniency is a choice of
the least undesirable option. More generally, the rule of law is eroded whenever the
government declines to adhere to it, even if the population has given it leave to do so.

100

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

directions. On the one hand, President Uribe's record-breaking
popularity is probably closely tied to his management of the conflict and the peace process. A Colombian news magazine
explained a spike in his approval ratings to 80% in December 2003
as a consequence of popular satisfaction with the first demobilization of paramilitaries that November. 222 Also, the AUC has
repeatedly proposed a binding popular referendum on the question of the paramilitaries' punishment, apparently confident that
it would come out their way.2 23 On the other hand, local media,
non-governmental organizations, congressional representatives
and the international community, all of which play an important
role in the shaping of public opinion, have been harsh critics of the
GOC's lenient stance. It is probably fair to conclude that most
Colombians do not approve of leniency as much as they are
resigned to it. 224 A resident in a small Colombian town controlled
by paramilitaries who demobilized in July expressed what is
likely a common sentiment: "What they did was horrible, but
something needed to be done to get them to leave, and this peace
225
law seems to have worked in that respect."
D.

Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation refers to "an induced reduction in a person's
propensity to commit undesirable acts." 226 Existing literature
gives short shrift to the potential for rehabilitating human rights
violators on the grounds that it has been ineffective in domestic
contexts 22 7 or that the class of criminals in post-conflict contexts
cannot be rehabilitated. Miriam Aukerman, for example, skims
over the rehabilitation issue by alluding to the impossibility of
rehabilitating a Pol Pot or a Pinochet.2 25 Her treatment of rehabilitation exemplifies the tendency among transitional justice writ222. Maria Fernanda Moreno, La Popularidadde Alvaro Uribe, SEMANA (Colom.),

Nov. 28, 2004, available at http://semana2.terra.com.co/opencms/opencms/Semana/
articulo.html?id=82687.
223. See Dan Molinski, Right-Wing FightersDemobilize, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan 19,
2005 available at http:/www.americas.org/item-17551 (noting that AUC is willing to
submit to popular referendum on jail time). This may be bravado, of course. Also, a
referendum on the topic would inevitably result in widespread intimidation and
coercion.
224. See, e.g., Colombia's Peace Bargain, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2003, at A22 ("Most
Colombians believe that such deals are the only hope of ending violence that has
killed tens of thousands and made large parts of the countryside lawless.").
225. Molinski, supra note 2.
226. SHAVELL, supra note 134, at 535.
227. See, e.g., Aukerman, supra note 130, at 71.
228. Id. at 72.
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ers to focus on high-ranking leaders who are guilty of crimes
punishable under international law. If we understand rehabilitation of ex-combatants as involving their economic, social and, to
some extent, political reintegration into civilian life, a successful
rehabilitation program is crucial to the achievement of several
goals of the Colombian peace process: preventing the re-emergence of armed groups and post-demobilization common crimes, as
well as enhancing the long-run prospects for peace. 229 "Disgruntled ex-soldiers" pose a serious threat to Colombian welfare as
they often seek out illegal and violent livelihoods if legitimate
ones are not forthcoming.23 0 Reintegration concerns influence the
design of benefits packages provided to demobilizing combatants,
which often include first-phase support (e.g. cash, food, medical
attention) and some longer-term assistance (e.g. subsequent cash
payments, training, education grants, counseling).2 3' Colombia's
demobilization laws provide for broad reintegration assistance to
demobilizing combatants, including civilian documents, medical
attention, security guarantees for the soldier and his family, cash,
schooling grants, training, small-business assistance, life insurance and job placement services.232 The major risk is that international donors, who often fund these benefits packages, will
continue to withhold funding from the Colombian peace process
due to their dissatisfaction with the Peace and Justice Law.233
Reintegration concerns should also figure prominently in the
229. See generally WAR
DEMOBILIZATION

FORCE

TO WORK

FORCE:

GLOBAL

(Natalie Pauwels ed., 2000) [hereinafter WAR

PERSPECTIVES

ON

FORCE TO WORK

FORCE].

230. Id. at 18. Addressing the risks of unsuccessful reintegration in post-conflict
contexts, Kees Kingma warns: "People with military skills but without a stable
livelihood are particularly easy to mobilize, even for vague political purposes. They
might also try to make a living through armed robbery or other illegal activities."
Kees Kingma, Post War Societies, in WAR FORCE TO WORK FORCE, supra note 229, at
221, 229.
231. See Kingma, supra note 133, at 28-29.
232. Decreto 128, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 45.073 D.O., 22 de Enero de
2003 (Colom.).
233. The big risk for reintegration is not in the law, but in its implementation. The
GOC has not earmarked sufficient finds for the benefits package and foreign donors,
who withheld funds on grounds of their disapproval of earlier versions of the
demobilization laws, still seem hesitant to get involved. With the exception of some
stopgap resources from the U.S. Agency for International Development, foreign aid
has not been forthcoming. See PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA, supra note 1, at 14
("International assistance to the Colombian peace process has reflected the
skepticism surrounding it."). In the absence of foreign aid, reintegration efforts are
unlikely to meet the requirements of the legal design for rehabilitation. For example,
after the first demobilization in November 2003, the ex-combatants spent three weeks
in a demobilization program and then "they were back on the streets." Disarming,Bit
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design of sanctions. One danger of ignoring them is that a
polarized debate between justice/punishment advocates and
peace/leniency advocates will generate the kind of middle-ground
sanctions that are most damaging to rehabilitation. Public shaming, lustration (removal or bans from government jobs) and economic sanctions are often advanced as striking a balance between
the ideals of justice and peace, but their very justification cuts
against rehabilitation. For example, in presenting the benefits of
truth commission, one scholar noted that they can "achieve punishment-like goals. Their reports can bring shame upon wrongdoers and lead to their ostracism from society."2 34 Aukerman also
asserted the following: "National truth commissions can generate
social opprobrium, turning perpetrators into social outcasts and
forcing them to face victims on television."235
These authors advocate shaming because it advances retributive (and possibly deterrent) goals of punishment without incurring the costs of full-blown prosecution. What is missing from
their analysis are the costs generated by failed rehabilitation. Put
bluntly, the GOC does not want to scatter about the country tens
of thousands of ostracized, unemployable, and probably armed
human rights violators. The literature seems to allow a government to pick freely from a list of possible sanctions, but rehabilitation concerns suggest that a government facing combat and crimeprone ex-combatants is much more restricted in its selection of
penalties. If it decides to release ex-combatants, it should work to
ensure that they are reintegrated into civilian life. At a minimum,
this requires legal employment and some measure of communal
participation. One writer on the situation in South Africa
described the choice as follows: "No society can afford to fail in
seeking the appeasement and/or reintegration of perpetrators into
society. The alternative is the imprisonment or the elimination of
those responsible for past crimes. The South African negotiated
settlement excluded that option."236
Therefore, the GOC's choice was limited to incapacitating
combatants or helping them become happy citizens. This does not
mean that the GOC should not engage in truth-gathering activities or even prevent ex-combatants from exercising some rights of
by Bit, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 2004, availableat LexisNexis Academic. ("Certainly,

the amateurish peace process would benefit from outside help.").
234. Landsman, supra note 129, at 89.
235. Aukerman, supra note 130, at 57 (internal quotations omitted).

236. Villavicencio, supra note 221, at 209.

2005]

MAKING PEACE WITH CRIMINALS

103

citizenship, including running for public office. It does mean that
the GOC should stop well short of tactics that turn ex-combatants
into social outcasts.
E.
1.

The Special Needs of TransitionalJustice

The Rule of Law

There are three characteristics of most transitional contexts
that augment the effect of punishment decisions on the rule of
law: political transition, state complicity and the large scale of the
crimes addressed. These characteristics are present in varying
degrees in the Colombian situation. The first circumstance, political transition, is barely relevant because the negotiations do not
entail any change to the bodies of government, its policies or the
constitutional order in Colombia.23 7 The second circumstance,
state complicity, is pertinent to the Colombian case given the
GOC-AUC links previously discussed,23 but the degree of complicity does not represent the paradigmatic case where the state has
perpetuated the crimes at issue (e.g. Guatemala). Thus, while the
rule-of-law consequences of a government holding itself above the
law are admittedly dire, these consequences are not necessarily
implicated in the GOC's treatment of paramilitaries. Neither the
GOC's ability nor its obligation to prosecute members of the
armed forces and civil servants for collaborating with the AUC is
affected by the demobilization laws.
The third characteristic concerning the scale of the crimes at
bar is highly relevant to the Colombian case and warrants a closer
look at the rule-of-law concerns posited by transitional justice
writers. A nutshell expression of the rule-of-law argument is that
the failure to enforce the law today diminishes the capacity of law
generally to govern societal conduct tomorrow. The consequent
harm is magnified by the gravity of the conduct that the disre237. Rule of law considerations are especially important to new democracies that
need to show their democratic and law-abiding credentials, while "failure to enforce
the law may undermine the legitimacy of a new government and breed cynicism
toward civilian institutions." Orlentlicher, supra note 124, at 378. Empirical data on
the link between prosecution and the success of a political transition is inconclusive.
See generally Aryeh Neier, What Should be Done About the Guilty?, in TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 172 (noting the impossibility of proving or disproving the
link between prosecution and the success of a political transition given the
empirically-large number of determinants of success). See also Teitel, supra note 128,
at 150 (suggesting that where prosecution precedes a successful transition it may be
"symptomatic" of powerful judiciary and democratic institutions rather than causal
factor of successful transition).
238. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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garded law targets and the scale of its non-enforcement. As Diane
Orlentlicher explains:
A complete failure of enforcement vitiates the authority of
law itself, sapping its power to deter proscribed conduct.
This may be tolerable when the law or the crime is of marginal consequence, but there can be no scope for eviscerating wholesale laws that forbid violence and that have been
violated on a massive scale. 9
What is at stake in Colombia are some 15,000 to 20,000
paramilitaries (and potentially a similar number of guerrillas)
who are accused of far-reaching and horrific crimes.
The scale of the crimes magnifies the "signal" sent by the
GOC and the judiciary to society upon making a punishment decision. The rule of law in Colombia will be negatively impacted by
the failure to punish paramilitaries under the following assumptions: (1) punishment decisions signal the GOC's attitude toward
the law; (2) this signal, in turn, influences societal attitudes
toward the GOC, the peace process, and the law; and (3) changes
in attitudes will result in changes in conduct, including diminished compliance with the law.
Negotiations set the tone for the peace process. A commitment on the part of the GOC to democratic ideals, including
accountability and human rights, would generate confidence in
these ideals and in the GOC's capacity to defend them. Conversely, impunity signals to the population that the rule of law is
ineffective and that democratic ideals have been compromised.240
The country is therefore ill-prepared for the challenges of peacebuilding, and violence is more likely to erupt again.
When society loses faith in the effectiveness or legitimacy of
the law, compliance may be negatively affected beyond what can
be explained by the decrease in deterrence. This is due to the fact
that many people follow the law because they see it as an expression of morally right behavior. Social norms and laws that are
perceived as legitimate reinforce one another and create positive
incentives for law-abiding citizens. 241' Lenient treatment blunts
the impact of these norms by sending mixed signals as to their
239. Orlentlicher, supra note 124, at 377.
240. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
241. Note that the power of social norms to encourage law-abiding behavior is not
limited to life-and-death laws. Eric Posner claims that people pay taxes more often
than the expected sanction for failing to do so would imply because they are obeying a
social norm of behavior. Posner, supra note 177, at 1783-84.
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wrongfulness.242 Application of the law, on the other hand, reaffirms the message and encourages law-abiding behavior. In the
context of paying taxes, for example, one writer argues that people
who have followed the rules and paid their taxes get utility from
seeing
that someone who took the unlawful route is punished for
24 3
it.

Finally, a failure to punish may weaken a government's claim
to a legitimate monopoly on the use of force and thus encourage
victims of the under-punished crimes to take matters into their
own hands. The theory is that punishment satisfies, or at least
channels, the urge for revenge and so "discourages vigilantism
and strengthens the rule of law." 244 Transitional justice literature

provides support for the notion that the incidence
of violent "self45
help" increases in the aftermath of conflict.
The Peace and Justice Law makes large concessions to the
242. To counter this effect, authorities seek to emphasize the exceptional nature of
the regime negotiated with the armed actors. For example, most amnesties do not
provide any cover for crimes committed that were not connected to the criminal's
participation in the group (outside of the 'scope of employment' so to speak). See
Aukerman, supra note 130, at 62 (noting South African amnesty applied only to
offenses that were associated with conflicts in the past). But maintaining this
distinction is not always straightforward. How does the GOC justify providing a
lower sentence to a paramilitary drug-trafficker than a garden-variety drugtrafficker? On average, a civilian convicted of drug trafficking in Colombia will be
sentenced to eight years in prison. But if the GOC imposes a similar sentence for drug
trafficking on combatants, it will (1) fail to get combatants to the negotiating table
and (2) lose flexibility to pursue marginal deterrence.
243. See generally Leo P. Martinez, Federal Tax Amnesty: Crime and Punishment
Revisited, 10 VA. TAX REV. 535 (1991).
244. Id. at 572 (quoting OLIVER W.

HOLMES,

THE

COMMON

LAw 40-42 (1881)). For

application of the theory to transitional contexts, see Malamud-Goti, supra note 164,
at 427-430 (citing CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996)).

245. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 127, at 513 n.47 (citing example of Haitians
committing acts against pardoned members of prior regime). However, the cases
cited often fail to isolate revenge as the motivation. For example, Aldana-Pindell
refers to the public lynchings that occurred in Guatemala after the peace was signed
as support for the argument that punishment is needed to channel the anger and
frustration of victims. Aldana-Pindell, supra note 125, at 1498. The lynchings in
Guatemala, however, were often a response to common crime and were neither
committed exclusively by victims nor targeted, generally, at former violators. See,
e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES - 1999, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/388.htm
(noting mob killings generally target persons accused of property crimes or
participation in criminal gangs). See also Will Weissart, Police Emergency in
Guatemala; Lack of Funds Hampers Ability to Fight Crime, WASH. POST, May 13,
2001, at A22 (attributing high number of mob killings to community frustration over
lack of police presence). Vigilantism is as likely to reflect a general decline in
compliance, resulting from the rule-of-law effects discussed already, or a societal
reaction to worsened security conditions, than a pent-up urge for revenge.
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paramilitaries and undoubtedly compromises a host of "democratic ideals." When the law passed, one legislator, who had
pushed for harsher sanctions, applied the foregoing analysis succinctly: "The message we are sending today is that crime does
pay."246 Yet the effect of the Peace and Justice Law on the rule of
law in Colombia may not be as detrimental as some predict. As
discussed above, many Colombians seem to condone the GOC's
action in letting the paramilitaries off easy. To the extent that
Colombians perceive leniency in this context as a necessary evil,
the effect on the rule of law may be tempered.
2.

Getting at the Truth

Like the rule of law, notions of truth are generally more central to transitional justice than to domestic law. At a minimum,
the establishment and publication of a truthful record contributes
to welfare in post-conflict countries in two ways: by providing a
more accurate history of the causes of conflict (probably minimizing the likelihood of re-emergence of the conflict) and by benefiting surviving victims and family members with answers to specific
questions. Additionally, truth may 1) benefit victims through
public acknowledgment of the harm they have suffered; 2) punish
injurers by shaming them; 7 3) facilitate social catharsis;248 and,
most controversially, 4) promote reconciliation.249
Much of the transitional justice literature on the topic of truth
is devoted to assessing the relative strengths of truth commissions 2 and trials .211 There is some consensus that commissions
246. Forero, supra note 9, at A3 (quoting congresswoman Gina Parody).
247. See Neier, supra note 237, at 180 (arguing that identification of perpetrators is
punishment and identification of victims is acknowledgment of their injuries).
248. See Luis Manuel Lasso, Desafios y Dilemas Sobre Verdad, Justicia y
Reparaci6n, SEMANA (Colom.), Apr. 16, 2004, available at http://semana2.terra.com.
co/archivo/articulosView.jsp?id=77886.
249. See Jonathan D. Tepperman, Truth and Consequences, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 128,
135 (2002) (citing poll showing 2/3 of South Africans said TRC made them angrier and
worsened race relations); but see Priscilla Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 19741994: A Comparative Study, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 225
(asserting that truth commissions favor reconciliation on balance).
250. Truth commissions are bodies established for investigating violations
perpetrated by the government or illegal armed groups. Hayner, supra note 249, at
225
251. There is no consensus as to which set-up is more conducive to truth-gathering.
The argument in favor of truth commissions is that trials do not encourage
confessions and that they produce isolated facts that are not conducive to painting a
full picture of the conflict. See, e.g., Landsman, supra note 129, at 88. It is also
argued, however, that violators may refuse to come forward to truth commissions.

20051

MAKING PEACE WITH CRIMINALS

107

are better for historical truth, while trials are better for factual
truth relating to particular incidents, perpetrators or victims.25 2
This second category of truth is of more immediate interest to surviving victims and family members who seek information from
perpetrators of crimes, such as the whereabouts of "disappeared"
persons or the location of corpses, and who can obtain utility from
making these facts public by clearing their names, if the victim's
innocence is implicated,2 5 strengthening their legal case for reparations, or having their stories told.
The most obvious and least debatable defect in the Peace and
Justice Law is its failure to generate combatant truth-telling. 54
As previously discussed, combatants who are eligible for a pardon
are formally required to disclose their crimes, but there is no benefit to them for doing so. Those against whom charges are pressed
have some incentive to cooperate with the authorities as the court
is entitled to take such cooperation into account when deciding on
the sentence, 5 but the limited range of sentences may render the
incentive insufficient. To encourage foot soldiers and commanders
to share information, the GOC could have either required disclosure as a condition to all governmental benefits, including leniency, or rewarded disclosure through the grant of additional
benefits, such as more leniency or cash.
The advantage of conditionality is that the full-package of
benefits is the biggest carrot the GOC has at its disposal to
encourage cooperation. The disadvantage is that a publiclyknown legal requirement of full disclosure makes demobilizing
combatants vulnerable to resistance from groups and individuals
who do not want their secrets revealed, including trafficking networks, combatants at large, commanders and colleagues, members of the armed forces, politicians, etc.256 A combined approach
Nsongurua J. Udombana, Globalization of Justice and the Special Court for Sierra
Leone's War Crimes, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 55, 119 (2003).
252. See Margaret Popkin and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigative
Commissions in Latin America, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 263
(describing truth as involving a personal as well as an historical accounting). See also
Aldana-Pindell, supra note 125, at 1439-40 (discussing victims' substantive "right to
truth" and the specific information needs that victims have at the end of a conflict).
253. See Aldana-Pindell, supra note 125, at 1440.
254. See, e.g., CCJ JUNE BULLETIN, supra note 6, at 2 ("Historical truth will not
emerge. Truth in the context of this law is limited to partial or incomplete versions in
each individual case, while ignoring the connection between them.").
255. Peace and Justice Law, art. 30, 45.980 D.O., 25 de Julio de 2005 (Colom.).
256. Some members of Colombia's "elite" are likely to be among those opposed to
full disclosure. Hugh Bronstein, Colombia Paras Disband, Rights Groups Wary,
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would require confession of a combatant's own crimes as a condition to eligibility for benefits, while rewarding any further cooperation. As the authorities will be largely unable to verify the
completeness of a combatant's confession, the law can incorporate
incentives for truthfulness. For example, the South African model
pardons crimes rather than persons, so that only those crimes
that have been confessed to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission are subject to pardon.25 7 The GOC could reward any further
cooperation by mitigating the sentence, accelerating parole or providing cash benefits (the latter was already available under prior
demobilization law) for information on the group's structure,
sources of financing, drug-trade links and crimes perpetrated by
other combatants.25 8
Victims and witnesses can also contribute to the establishment of a truthful record. Despite the benefits generated by truth
for victims and society, truth writ large suffers from the market
failures of any public good. Given that victims and witnesses
incur risk when they speak out against IAGs, they will likely
under-report in the absence of appropriate incentives. One incentive is that victims increase the probability of receiving compensation or reparations when they come forward to self-identify and
help prove their injuries. Leniency, on the other hand, is a disin25 9
centive to victims - their desire for retribution is not satisfied
and their security risks are increased because the injurer is not
incapacitated. For non-victim witnesses, who are not eligible for
reparations, seeing wrongdoers punished may be the only incentive to come forward.
The Colombian law provides some encouragement for victims
to come forward by offering reparations from two sources. Under
Articles 43-45 of the new law, when a combatant accepts the
charges against him, victims of those crimes may come forward to
claim reparations from the defendant, who will be liable only to
Jan. 18, 2005, availableat http://www.boston.com/news/world/latinamerica/
articles/2005/01/18/colombia paramilitaries-disband-rights-group wary/.
257. See Stephane Leman-Langlois & Clifford D. Shearing, Repairing the Future:
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission at Work, in CRIME, TRUTH
AND JUSTICE 222, 227 (George Gilligan & John Pratt eds., 2004) (explaining that
amnesty provided immunity from prosecution for the acts described by the amnestyseeker in his or her application).
258. Uribe's team pushed for more flexibility in prison terms, while advocates of the
Senate Proposal insisted, successfully, on a minimum sentence of five years. See
HRW 2005 REPORT, supra note 48.
259. See SHAVELL, supra note 134, at 538 (noting that the retributive desire
motivates people to report criminals to the authorities).
REUTERS,
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the extent that the monetary costs are payable from illegally
acquired assets.26 °
Most victims seeking reparations will not be in the position to
demand them of a specific wrongdoer, both because victims may
not be able to identify the injurer (or at least not the person with
command responsibility) and because the wrongdoer may be one
of the vast majority of paramilitaries against whom no charges are
levied. Article 43 governs this situation, whereby a victim who is
able to prove his or her injuries is eligible for reparations from a
state-managed fund - so long as resources are available.2 6 '
In light of the limited number of judicial proceedings against
individual paramilitaries and the uncertainty of resources from
the state-managed fund, it may be that the perceived benefits to
victims will not outweigh the costs of coming forward. Even if victims do appear, their informational role is curtailed by the perfunctory nature of the proceedings. If most combatants against
whom charges are brought accept these charges (which is expected
given the powerful incentives for doing so), the expedited proceedings will provide little opportunity for the victims, the wrongdoers
or the state to develop a comprehensive, truthful record of the
injurious events.26 2
VI.

EXTERNALITIES

When a top paramilitary commander, Salvatore Mancuso,
demobilized in December 2004 he made this statement: "With my
soul flooded in humility, I ask the pardon of the people of Colombia. I ask forgiveness of the nations of the world, including the
United States of America, if by action or omission I offended."2"
His apology recognizes the claims of the international community
to an interest in the outcome of the conflict and negotiations in
Colombia and suggests that the AUC takes seriously the threat of
external interference.
A.

Cross-BorderEffects of Crimes and Punishment

The idea that certain human rights violations have cross-bor260. Peace and Justice Law, arts. 43-45.
261. Id. art. 43.
262. See Jose Miguel Vivanco, The Role of Third Parties and Issues for the
International Community, in PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA, supra note 1, at 45, 77
(arguing that anticipated sentence mechanism "makes it less likely that serious,
rigorous investigations of very, very complex crimes will be conducted"),
263. Sullivan, supra note 26, at A36 (emphasis added).
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der effects has been gaining currency at least since the end of
World War II. One characterization of the externality focuses on
the crimes themselves, which are argued to violate universal values and interests. Another suggests that the failure to punish certain crimes in one country weakens deterrence and rule of law in
others." 4 The jurisdiction of international law is expanding to
reflect the notion that certain crimes generate cross-border
effects,2 6 s in part to solve the collective action problem in which
each country facing the trade-offs discussed in this paper can be
expected to under-punish its criminals.2 66
Given the focus of this paper is limited to Colombian welfare,
it is not important to assess the strength of these arguments; however, the measures taken by the international community to force
Colombia to modify its punishment decisions - on the grounds
that these externalities exist - are important for our purposes. To
push the GOC to more severe punishment than originally contemplated in Uribe's first proposal, the international community has
wielded two powerful tools: withholding financial aid and public
disapproval. The GOC needs approximately $130 million to pay
for the demobilization (excluding imprisonment costs)2 7 and substantially more money for peace-building efforts. At a donor's
meeting in February 2005, foreign governments conditioned financial aid on the GOC strengthening its penal alternatives bill to
require demobilizing combatants to disclose more information and
hand-over all illegally-acquired wealth.268
The international community has also been public in its disapproval of leniency in dealing with the AUC. For example, not a
264. See, e.g., Neil Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 127, 129 (1996), quoted in Aukerman, supra note 130, at 65 (warning that
failure to prosecute leaders "can be expected not only to encourage new rounds of
mass abuses in the country in question but also embolden the instigators of crimes
against humanity elsewhere").
265. See William A. Schabas, Punishment of Non-State Actors in Non-International
Armed Conflict, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 907 (2003).
266. See Orlentlicher, supra note 124.
267. Sullivan, supra note 26, at A36. See also Pardo, supra note 8, at 21
(extrapolating costs from BCN demobilization to estimate total costs of $12,00015,000 per ex-combatant). The GOC has requested foreign aid to cover $5700 per
capita (or $114 million for 20,000 ex-combatants). See William Wood (U.S.
Ambassador to Colombia), The Role of Third Parties and Issues for the International
Community, in PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA, supra note 1, at 45, 54. The ex-

combatants spent three weeks in a demobilization program and then "they were back
on the streets." Disarming,Bit by Bit, supra note 233.
268. See Next Steps in Colombia, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2005, available at
LexisNexis Academic.
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single U.N. or E.U. delegate participated in the negotiations, a
measure that many saw as a sharp rebuke of the Uribe administration.26 9 From the U.S., groups of senators have sent President
Uribe several letters,2 7 ° first to dissuade him from offering the
paramilitaries an amnesty, and later to insist on a legal framework that complied with international guidelines on justice, truth
and reparations. 2 1 This disapproval affects the reputation of the
GOC and influences Colombians' attitudes toward the peace talks.
B.

Extradition for Drug Crimes

Another externality, emerging from the drug-related activities of Colombia's IAGs, hits the United States the hardest. The
U.S., the principal market for Colombian drugs, absorbs 70% of its
cocaine and 65% of its heroine; a little less than 90% of cocaine
purchased in the United States originates in Colombia.272 The
AUC has been accused of trafficking most of the cocaine that
makes it into U.S. cities.27 3 In a continuing effort to stem the
north-bound supply of drugs from Colombia, the United States
has funded massive drug-eradication programs, classified eighteen paramilitary leaders as cocaine "kingpins," and issued extradition orders for at least six AUC commanders.27 4 One of these
orders is for Salvatore Mancuso who is wanted in the United
States for the export of seventeen tons of cocaine (estimated mar5
ket value of $1.7 billion) into the United States. 27
Extradition has been a wildcard in the negotiations with
paramilitaries. The prospect of extradition played a large part in
bringing the AUC to table 27 ' and immunity from extradition has
been their most fervent demand. Off the record, the Uribe admin269. Constanza Viera, Colombia: Uribe Says He Hopes to Demobilise
Paramilitaries,INTER PRESS SERVICE, July 6, 2004, availableat LexisNexis Academic.
270. Letter from U.S. Senators to Alvaro Uribe (Sept 23, 2003), available at http:l
www.lawg.org/countries/Colombia/dearcol.htm ("[A] clear sign of your government's
commitment to shattering the links between members of the security forces and the
terrorist paramilitaries would be the aggressive prosecution of high-ranking officers
.... "). See also Viera, supra note 269 (citing U.S. Ambassador saying peace
negotiations are more of a step forward for drug trafficking than for peace).
271. See ICG 2005 REPORT, supra note 18, at 23.
272. Peter Slevin, Colombian PresidentDefends Amnesty for ParamilitaryTroops,
WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2003, at A17.
273. Forero, supra note 9, at A3.
274. Id.
275. Slevin, supra note 272. Note that financial estimates are based on 1999 prices.
See also RABASA & CHALK, supra note 1, at 17.
276. Sullivan, supra note 26, at A36 (citing view of GOC officials that extradition
played a key role in getting AUC to negotiate).

112

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

istration has softened on this point.2 77 On the record, the executive and legislative branches have punted on the issue by leaving
it out of the text of the Peace and Justice Law altogether (referring instead to the GOC's continued commitment to abide by its
obligations under international law and treaties).2 78 As discussed
below, President Uribe is likely to retain some discretion over the
issue of extradition and may even withhold orders. Thus, as with
other forms of punishment, the GOC should decide how to trade
off extradition against other sanctions.
Relative to other forms of harsh sanctions, extradition generates few advantages in terms of advancing societal preferences
(most Colombians seem to oppose extradition as an expression of
American imperialism, hypocrisy or meddling)2 79 and it does nothing to strengthen popular perceptions of the strength or legitimacy of Colombia's democratic institutions. Moreover, extradition
could incur numerous costs to a peace process. Attaching a harsh
penalty to drug-trafficking limits the GOC's maneuvering room to
achieve marginal deterrence through higher sanctions on the
many crimes the GOC may deem more serious than selling
cocaine to Americans. Also, if Colombia were to decide to release
combatants on pardons or suspended sentences, hauling off only
drug-traffickers to prison will create a problem of proportionality.
As a Colombian columnist noted, requiring drug-traffickers to face
criminal prosecution in the United States while "forgiving" those
who guilty of massacres sends a perverse message.2 80
However, the benefits of a sanction that imposes almost no
financial burden on the GOC and terrifies combatants more than
domestic imprisonment 8 ' are not insignificant. First, the extradition option achieves incapacitation and deterrence at a much
277. The Peace Commissioner told AUC negotiators that they should trust Uribe to
protect them from extradition. Revelaciones Explosivas, supra note 21. See also Juan
Forero, Colombia Proposes 10-Year Terms for ParamilitaryAtrocities, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 16, 2004, at All (noting GOC signals of flexibility on extradition). Uribe has
said that he will not hand Mancuso over for extradition. See Popularidadde Jefe
ParamilitarSupera Ministro de Defensa en Colombia, supra note 32.
278. Timonazo, SEMANA (Colom.), Apr. 3, 2004, available at http://semana2.terra.
com.co/archivo/articulosView.jsp?id=77657.
279. Concerning the U.S. demands for extradition, a leading news magazine argued
that concern about the opinions of foreigners made negotiation too hard. See
Caballero, supra note 220. See also Yamid Amat, Nadie Se Entrega Para Que Lo
Extraditen, EL TIEMPO, April 3, 2004, availableat ElTiempo.com (quoting Colombian
Monsignor who said that "Nobody turns himself in just to be extradited.").
280. Cabellero, supra note 220.
281. See, e.g., Hernando Gomez Buendia, Las Dos Anomalias, SEMANA (Colom.),
April 7, 2004, available at http://www.semana.com.co/opencms/opencms/Semana/
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lower cost than imprisoning these combatant/drug-traffickers in
Colombia. Also in the event that the GOC ever opts for a no-negotiation stance and seeks victory on the battlefield, the threat of
extradition would become a net positive externality on Colombia.
Like the probability of suit in a foreign court28 2 or an international
tribunal 283 or a future nullification of an amnesty,2 4 the prospect
of extradition increases the probability of sanctions facing a combatant at almost no cost to the GOC.285
Perhaps most importantly, extradition - more accurately, the
GOC's power not to extradite - has given the GOC much-needed
bargaining power.28 6 Uribe has demonstrated his willingness to
extradite by sending more suspected drug-traffickers to the U.S.
than any of his predecessors.2 7 On the carrot side, Uribe has
repeatedly offered immunity, at least temporarily, from extradition as a reward for sustaining peace talks with the GOC. Uribe
announced in 2004, "[elxtradition in all its rigor will be applied to
those not in a peace process."2 8 His stance was made credible
when he carried out a threat to extradite a FARC leader if the
29
guerrillas did not release certain hostages.
articulo.html?id=77746 ("It's not punishment in Colombia but extradition that keeps
the AUC awake at night.") (translation by author).
282. An example of proceedings in foreign courts was provided by a U.S. federal
court when it asserted jurisdiction under the Torture Victims Act to hold two retired
generals from El Salvador liable for $54 million in damages for acts committed in the
1980s. David Gonzales, Torture Victims in El SalvadorAre Awarded $54 Million,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2002, at Al.
283. While few believe that the International Criminal Court would step in given
its own jurisdictional limitations and constrained resources, the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court in Hague did request information on the GOC-AUC
negotiations in March 2005. ICG 2005 REPORT, supra note 18, at 19.
284. In Argentina, Chile and Peru earlier amnesties have been de facto or de jure
nullified. See Juan Forero, Colombia Plans to Ease Penalties for Right-Wing Death
Squads, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at A7. See also Ronald C. Skye, The Legitimacy of
Amnesties Under InternationalLaws and General Principlesof Anglo-American Law,
43 VA. J. IN'L L. 173, 200 (2002-03) (citing judicial events in Chile and Argentina to
support proposition that "amnesties do not last").
285. However, even if the GOC were not negotiating more lenient sanctions, it
would still be interested in setting the schedule of sanctions to achieve marginal
deterrence. A harsh sentence for drug trafficking blunts this tool.
286. Vivanco, supra note 262, at 75 ("Extradition constitutes the only leverage in
the process and the only reason that paramilitary leaders are taking the negotiations
seriously."),
287. Sullivan, supra note 26.
288. Juan Forero, Surge in Extradition of Colombian Drug Suspects to U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2004, at A3.
289. See ColombiaExtradites Top GuerrillaLeader, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A9
(reporting GOC extradition of highest-ranking FARC leader in its custody after
issuing ultimatum to free sixty-three hostages).
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Of course, ignoring U.S. extradition demands generates new
costs. The U.S. is concerned that the peace process is affording
cover to Colombia's most powerful drug dealers.2" The tools of
influence available to the international community generally
threaten more harm when wielded by the U.S., which plays a
larger role in hemispheric policies and provides Colombia with
substantial financial aid.2 9'
The Peace and Justice Law manages the extradition issue
with some finesse. The Law leaves pre-existing extradition rules
intact thereby denying the paramilitaries' demand for express
immunity from extradition, and so according at in least part with
the U.S. understanding that "no promises regarding extradition
are made or implied in any part of the law." 92 Nonetheless, the
law may shield demobilizing fighters from extradition on two legal
theories. First, any ex-combatant who admits the charges against
him, or is tried for them, can later defend against extradition as
constituting "double jeopardy."29 3 Second, if a combatant's involvement in drug trafficking is deemed by the court to be connected to
or in furtherance of his status as a paramilitary, such involvement
will be classified as a "political crime." Under Colombian law, no
citizen may be extradited for political crimes. 29 Both legal routes
are uncertain and the AUC can be expected to lobby for the President to exercise his discretion not to issue extradition orders.
Such uncertainty is ideal inasmuch as the possibility of immunity
suffices to persuade the AUC to continue to demobilize without
requiring the GOC to surrender its leverage or disregard U.S.
wishes.
290. See Forero, supra note 9, at A3 ("The biggest concern in Washington is that
commanders who are, in essence, drug traffickers will remain largely free to continue
moving cocaine.").
291. See Give Up and You Can Stay Home, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 31, 2004, available
at LexisNexis Academic (reporting that the United States provides the GOC with
$500 million per annum in military aid); Forero, supra note 9, at A3 (noting that from
2000-2005 U.S. provided Colombia with $3 billion for military and drug eradication
purposes).
292. Wood, supra note 267, at 52.
293. See SMOKE AND MmRRORs, supra note 8, at 9.
294. See id. at 56 n.151; ICG 2005 REPORT, supra note 18, at 19 n.201. It is also
unlawful for persons to be barred from running for public office as the result of
political crimes. The GOC argues that this legal route is not open to combatants or
the courts because Colombia has signed an international treaty expressly prohibiting
the classification of drug trafficking as a political crime and has referred to the treaty
in the Peace and Justice Law. Peace and Justice Law, art. 72, 45.980 D.O., 25 de
Julio de 2005 (Colom.) (confirming the continuing effectiveness of Paragraph 10 of
Article 3 of United Nations Convention Against Drug-Trafficking, Vienna, 20
September 1998).
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CONCLUSION

The Peace and Justice Law, Colombia's most recent innovation in its four-decade pursuit of peace with illegal armed groups,
reflects difficult trade-offs between distinct and sometimes inconsistent goals of the peace process. Many argue that the trade-offs
were ill-advised and that too much was sacrificed in order to
achieve a transient peace with the paramilitaries. Although it is
too soon to tell what impact the Law will have on paramilitaries,
other illegal armed groups or Colombian society, it seems likely
that the sanctions and conditions provided in the law will prove
too lenient to achieve a net benefit to social welfare in Colombia.
The sanctions regime adopted is largely a product of the negotiations between the GOC and the AUC. A closer look at the
dynamics of those talks suggests that they cannot constitute a
reliable measure of optimal punishment. Excessive optimism and
impulsiveness on the part of the AUC, alongside agency problems
that distort the positions on both sides of the bargaining table,
will tend to push the solution out of a reasonable range. Moreover, there is no guarantee that a "reasonable offer," i.e., one that
would be reached by rational actors, would be optimal in light of
the utilitarian purposes of punishment.
Second, our assessment of the effectiveness of punishment
options in advancing the goals of the Colombian peace process,
particularly deterrence of IAGs remaining on the battlefield and
future combatants, suggests that the GOC should push for a level
of punishment that is more severe than what the AUC (or any
other IAG) would accept under prevailing military conditions.
This is essentially the position advanced by the international community and human rights groups who lobbied for more jail time
and tougher conditionality on leniency. However, the usefulness
of the economic approach is to highlight the natural consequences
of such a position. The costs of insisting on harsher punishment
include the harm inflicted by the AUC after they walk away from
the table and may be measured in civilian deaths, battle casualties, forced displacement and various acts of brutality. The cost
also includes efforts by the GOC to devalue the status quo facing
IAGs to the point that they prefer harsher sanctions over remaining on the battlefield,29 5 a cost that may be borne in part by the
295. It is reasonable to rule out an outright military victory over IAGs in the
foreseeable future given the historical wherewithal of well-funded, mobile, non-state
forces and so to predict that the conflict will be brought to end through some kind of
negotiated settlement requiring the consent of IAGs.
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GOC and IAGs, but will largely be passed on to civilians as the
conflict escalates.
Proponents of more severe punishment rarely address this
category of cost realistically. One advocate of the obligation to
prosecute human rights violations concludes that apprehensions
that punishment will prolong conflict are outweighed by deterrence concerns "in part because the prospect of facing prosecutions
is rarely, if ever, the decisive factor in determining whether a
29 Given the AUC's motivation in coming to
transition will occur.""
the negotiating table, prosecution was very probably a decisive
factor in Colombia, as it has been in other post-conflict and transitional contexts.2 97 To move the debate in Colombia forward, those
demanding stiffer punishment should acknowledge that a return
to battle and an escalation of the conflict may be preconditions to
combatants' agreement on higher sanctions.
On the deterrence issue, the argument that combatant crime
is inherently undeterrable is unpersuasive. A government can
deter the worst crimes by tying the level of punishment to the
severity of crime and to the combatant's rank, given that the
deterrability of criminal conduct correlates to the degree of decision-making power possessed by the criminal. Since the decision
to join armed groups may be a deterrable choice for some people,
even lower-ranking combatants who have not committed serious
crimes (as defined by the law) should not be let off the hook without any sanction. This group of combatants should be tried and
sentenced, with immediate suspension of sentences conditioned on
full confession of crimes. These combatants should be required to
contribute to reparations through public apologies and community
service, but the GOC should also find ways to help ex-combatants
reintegrate into civilian life.
As implemented so far, Colombia's demobilization laws fail to
generate truth in spite of the availability of a relatively low-cost
mechanism for incentivizing combatants to disclose their knowledge. The law could condition the pardon for foot soldiers on a full
disclosure, at least of their own involvement in crimes. Instead,
the Peace and Justice Law sacrifices a unique opportunity to sat296. Orlentlicher, supra note 124, at 382.
297. See, e.g., Tepperman, supra note 249, at 133. (quoting South African President
Mbeki's assertion that "[hiad there been the threat of Nuremberg-style trials for
members of the apartheid state security establishment we would never have
undergone a peaceful change"). See also O'SHEA, supra note 126, at 22 (noting that
amnesties in Chad, Uganda, Philippines, Ghana and Mauritania were used to
persuade rebels to come forward).
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isfy the specific informational needs of victims, build cases against
those guilty of the worst crimes and to construct a truthful, historical narrative of the conflict.

